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INTRODUCTION

B

URDENS of proof matter. Ours is an adversarial system in
which parties to civil litigation are responsible for gathering facts
and presenting those facts to a judge or jury for resolution. The burden of proof mechanism, whether created by statute or by courts, facilitates the orderly presentation of evidence to a court and,
ultimately, to a trier of fact. At least that is the theory, for it is clear
that the practical task of allocating the burden of proof in civil litigation has vexed courts and commentators for some time now. Perhaps
driven by the inequities of foisting onto one party the obligation to
prove facts often in the opposing party's control, courts have created a
variety of burden-shifting schemes in which the plaintiff and the defendant carry different burdens at different stages of civil litigation.'
1. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 289 (1996) (discussing the shifting of burden of proof in civil forfeiture); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 50
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Commentators have also struggled to articulate coherent and principled approaches to allocating the burden of proof in a number of civil
contexts.2 The view that emerges from the decisions and the commentary is that attempts to formulate a comprehensive rule for allocating
(1996) (discussing the circumstances under which the burden shifts to the state when
dealing with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,76768 (1995) (examining when the burden of proof shifts regarding peremptory challenges based on race); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers
Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993) (indicating when the burden of production
shifts to the employer in ERISA cases); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 57 (1991) (discussing the shift of the burden of production to the government
when an arrested individual does not receive probable cause determination within 48
hours); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (discussing the shifting burden when there is a violation of Equal Protection Clause challenges); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (explaining which party carries
the burden of proof in a Title VII action); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,46162 (1972) (holding that under the federal immunity statute, the burden of production
shifts to the government when the defendant testifies under a grant of immunity);
Boehms v. Crowell, 139 F.3d 452, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing the burden-shifting framework for an Age Discrimination in Employment Act plaintiff), cert. denied,
119 S. CL 866 (1999); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711,712 (7th Cir.
1997) (explaining the establishment of a prima facie case under the burden-shifting
approach in the context of the Family and Medical Leave Act); Monette v. Electronic
Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1996) (examining the burdens of
production of employers and employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
2. See, eg., Ronald J. Allen, Preswunptions, Inferences and Burden of Proofin
Federal Civil Actions-An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposalfor

Reform, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 892 (1982) (addressing the interplay between allocating

the burdens of persuasion and production and evidentiary presumptions); Alan K.
Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and tie Role of Facts
in ConstitutionalTort Law, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1997) (discussing the proper method

of allocating the burden of proving qualified immunity in civil rights cases); Neil B.

Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect

Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 385 (1985) (addressing the role of probabilistic judgments in assessing evidence and the burden of persuasion); Roger B. Dworkin, Easy
Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof,25 Vand. L Rev. 1151 (1972) (discussing the
different formulations for allocating burdens of proof and presumptions and proposing the elimination of burdens of proof in civil litigation); Richard D. Friedman, Dealing with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961 (1997) (addressing the
problem of allocating burdens of proof when evidence is missing); Bruce L Hay &
Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective,26
J. Legal Stud. 413 (1997) (discussing the law-and-economics view of burdens of
proof); Jerome A. Hoffman & Wiliam A. Schroeder, Burdens of Proof,38 Ala. L
Rev. 31 (1986) (presenting the different conceptions of burdens of proof); Thomas R.
Lee, Pleadingand Proof The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997 B.Y.U. L Rev. 1
(presenting a cost model for burden allocation); Leo P. Martinez, Tar Collection and
Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 Hastings LJ. 239
(1988) (discussing the burden of proof in the tax context); John T. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion,68 Harv. L
Rev. 1382 (1955) (arguing that the burden of production is derivative of the burden of
persuasion); Chris W. Sanchirico, Tie Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple
Model of Mechanism Design, 17 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 431 (1997) (providing an eco-

nomic analysis of allocating the burden of proof); Marshall S. Sprung, Note, Taking
Sides: The Burden of ProofSwitch in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1301
(1996) (discussing the burden of proof in the context of takings law).
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the burden of proof-one applicable to every cause of action or de-

fense-are destined for failure.3

Nonetheless, although fashioning a universal allocation rule has
proved difficult, the tools for designing a burden-of-proof rule specific
to a cause of action, defense, or particular statute are well-known and
generally agreed upon. Primary among these tools is the understanding that the burden of proof is comprised of two distinct elements: the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion.4 Historically, the
burden of production has been characterized as the obligation imposed on a party to present a court with enough evidence to avoid a
directed verdict; it is, quite simply, the burden of showing that the case
should go forward.5 The burden of persuasion, on the other hand, has
been described as the burden of proving to a trier of fact that the
evidence, construed in light of applicable legal principles, compels a
particular result.6 Whereas the burden of production often shifts from
party to party, the burden of7 persuasion remains with the same party
throughout the trial process.
Analyses of burden-of-proof allocation have largely focused on substantive causes of action and defenses. So, for example, it is well-established that a plaintiff generally has the burden of proving the
elements of negligence, and a defendant has the burden of proving
affirmative defenses such as comparative negligence.8 By contrast,
relatively little attention has been devoted to constructing a scheme
for allocating the burden of proving federal subject matter jurisdiction. Perhaps that is because the issue seems well-settled. It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that a
party seeking to invoke the power of an Article III court bears the
burden of demonstrating that either the Constitution or some act of
3. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1152 (recognizing that attempts to formulate general rules for allocating the burden of proof "have been unable to remove the
fog, despite substantial efforts at clarification").
4. See, e.g., 2 McCormick on Evidence § 336, at 568 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed.,
1992) [hereinafter McCormick on Evidence] (discussing the burden of production and

the burden of persuasion as two distinct elements); James B. Thayer, A Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence 355 (1898) (examining several ways that the phrase "burden of

proof' is used in legal discussion). Professor McNaughton was not persuaded by the
burden of production/burden of persuasion distinction. See McNaughton, supra note
2, at 1382, 1390-91. And Professor Dworkin has noted the negative consequences that

come about when the burden of production/burden of persuasion distinction is used.
See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1157-64, 1178-81. We shall have more to say about
these views later. See infra Part II.A-B (arguing that, in the context of prescribing a

burden-of-proof rule for federal subject matter jurisdiction in the FTCA context, the
burden of production/burden of persuasion distinction has important practical benefits and avoids the problems that have plagued burden-of-proof allocation generally).
5. See 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 336, at 568-69.

6. See id. at 569.
7. See id. at 568-69.
8. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 38,

65, at 239, 451 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton] (discussing the plaintiff's
and the defendant's respective burdens in litigation).
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Congress opens the federal courthouse doors to a claim. 9 Yet, as

ubiquitous as this principle may be, it has not been consistently applied, with some courts turning the principle on its head and imposing
on the non-jurisdiction-seeking party the ultimate burden of proving
(the negative proposition) that federal subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking. 10
The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") is a statute in which this
type of burden-shifting has occurred. The FTCA waives the United
States' immunity in tort, holding the United States liable for the acts
or omissions of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment." The Act's waiver of immunity, however, does not provide
Article I courts with a jurisdictional blank check, in which courts
may exercise jurisdiction over any tort suit brought against the federal
government. Rather, the FTCA imposes on plaintiffs a series of conditions that must be met before a federal district court may exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over an FTCA claim. Thus, for example,
an FTCA plaintiff must first present her tort claim to the appropriate
federal agency for possible settlement within two years after the claim
accrues.12 Failure to meet this administrative-exhaustion and statuteof-limitations requirement deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction to consider the tort suit.' 3

In addition, the FTCA contains a

number of exceptions to federal subject matter jurisdiction, immunizing the United States from certain types of tort actions. The United
States cannot be sued for discretionary conduct that implicates federal
policy, for the acts of independent contractors, for its misrepresentations, or for other specified torts.' 4 All of these exceptions are con9. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994);
Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 22-23 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
Wright, Federal Courts].
10. See, e.g., Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887,896
(5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act and holding that a
foreign sovereign bears the ultimate burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking); Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696,701-702 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting
the Federal Tort Claims Act and holding that the United States bears the ultimate
burden of proving an exception to Congress's limited waiver of sovereign immunity);
Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (imposing on the United
States the burden of proving a plaintiff has not complied with the FTCA's statute of
limitations); Carlyle v. United States, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the United States bears the burden of proving an exception to federal subject matter
jurisdiction); Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1952) (same).
11. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1994).
12. See id §§ 2401(b), 2675(a).
13. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-13 (1993) (holding that failure
to meet the exhaustion requirement represents a jurisdictional bar to suit); United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979) (holding that failure to meet the twoyear limitations period represents a failure to meet a condition of the FTCA's waiver
of sovereign immunity).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (excluding independent contractors with the United
States from the term "Federal Agency"); id. § 2680(a) (discussing the discretionary
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gressionally imposed conditions on the FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity.
Whether the United States or the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence or nonexistence of the FTCA's jurisdictional condi15
tions has produced a confusing array of approaches to allocation.
Are the jurisdictional conditions affirmative defenses, imposing on the
United States the burden of proving a lack of subject matter jurisdiction? Or, are they pure jurisdictional conditions, imposing on the
FTCA plaintiff the burden of demonstrating that a federal court has
jurisdiction to entertain the FTCA suit? To complicate matters further, courts have manipulated the burden of proving the FTCA's jurisdictional conditions through the procedural vehicle of "Rule 12(b)(1)
conversion." Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits the government to move to dismiss an FTCA action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.' 6 The plaintiff bears the burden of
17
proving subject matter jurisdiction in the Rule 12(b)(1) context.
Rule 12(b)(1) motions, however, are routinely-and mistakenlyconverted into Rule 56 motions for summary judgment, imposing on
the United States the burden of proving that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding jurisdiction.' 8 Plainly, the Rule
56 burden of proof is at odds with that governing Rule 12(b)(1).
These questions are not theoretical musings about the structure of
the FTCA or idle inquiries into the nuances of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Instead, we raise these issues because their resolution carries significant, real-world consequences for those suing the
United States, for those defending the United States, and for the
courts themselves, who must adjudicate the rights, remedies, and defenses available to FTCA plaintiffs and the federal government.
Plainly, who bears the burden of proving jurisdiction may fundamentally affect the course of discovery. Parties enter the discovery process
with a set of expectations about the type and quantity of evidence
they need to prove a cause of action or defense. The allocation of the
function exception); id. § 2680(h) (explaining the misrepresentation exception and
other specified tort exceptions).
15. Compare Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding

that the government bears the ultimate burden of proof on the discretionary function
exception), and Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (imposing

on the United States the burden of proving that a plaintiff has not complied with the
FTCA's statute of limitations), with Aragon v. United States, 146 F.3d 819, 823 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the discretionary

function exception), and Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to the FTCA's statute of limitations), and Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 60 (7th Cir. 1985)
(same).
16. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

17. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.
1977).
18. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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burden of proof directs parties to devote their resources to discovering enough facts to either avoid a dismissal, obtain a dismissal, or ultimately prevail at trial. At the same time, allocation rules give courts
decision-making heuristics (procedural road maps, if you will) that can
be used to wade through sometimes complex bodies of evidence.
Much has been written about the substantive requirements of the
jurisdictional conditions of the FTCA. Commentators have paid particular attention to administrative exhaustion, 19 the Act's statute of
limitations, and the discretionary function exception. 2 Although
19. See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy, Shielding the Plaintiff'sAchilles' Heel: Tort Claim
Notices to Governmental Entities, 28 DePaul L. Rev. 609 (1979) (analyzing the development of statutory pre-suit notice requirements); Michaefle F. Pitard, Procedural
Aspects of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 21 Loy. L Rev. 899 (1975) (discussing the
application of the FTCA); Rollin A. Van Broekhoven, The Federal Tort Claims Act
and Administrative Claims, 20 Baylor L. Rev. 336 (1968) (pointing out changes affecting the prospective claimant under the FTCA and the problem areas which exist);
Donald N. Zillman, Presentinga Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 43 La. L
Rev. 961 (1983) (discussing the FTCA's application and presentation requirements);
Daniel M. Katlein, Comment, Administrative Claims and the Substitution of the
United States as Defendant Under the FederalDriversAct: The Catch 22 of tie Federal
Tort Claims Act?, 29 Emory L. 755 (1980) (discussing the interaction between the
Federal Drivers Act and the administrative requirement for FTCA actions); Note,
Claim Requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal Notice or Substantial
Documentation?,81 Mich. L. Rev. 1641 (1983) (explaining the administrative requirements of the FTCA); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of Claim Requirement, 67
Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1982) (examining the notice requirement under the FTCA).
20. See, e.g., Ugo Colella, The Case for Borrowing a Limitations Period for
Deemed-DenialSuits Brought Pursuantto the Federal Tort Claims Act, 35 San Diego
L. Rev. 391 (1998) (discussing the statute of limitations requirements of the FTCA);
Carl T. Grasso, The Statute of Limitations as Applied to Medical MalpracticeActions
Brought Under the FederalTort ClaimsAct, 117 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1987) (same); Richard
Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act:
The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 Seton Hall L Rev. 885 (1999) (same);
Richard Parker, Is the Doctrineof Equitable Tolling Applicable to the Limitations Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1992) (explaining the equitable tolling and the FCA); Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of
Action Under the FTCA: A Synthesis and Proposal,28 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (1991)
(proposing an amendment of the FTCA's statute of limitations); Carl M. Wagner,
United States v. Kubrick.- Scope and Application, 120 Mil. L Rev. 139 (1988) (proposing a change to the FTCA accrual method).
21. See, e.g., John W. Bagby & Gary L. Gittings, The Elusive DiscretionaryFunction Exception from Government Tort Liability: The NarrowingScope of FederalLiability, 30 Am. Bus. Li. 223 (1992) (proposing a new model for analyzing the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA); David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer,
The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to
Varig to Berkovitz, 25 Idaho L. Rev. 291 (1989) (discussing the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA); Grover Glenn Hankins, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A
Smooth Stone for the Sling, 31 Gonz. L. Rev. 27 (1995196) (same); William P. Kratzke,
The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of die DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 Admin. LJ. Am. U. 1, 5, 55-57 (1993) (discussing the
courts' role in construing the discretionary function exception pursuant to the objectives of tort law); Harold J. Krent, PreservingDiscretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 871, 875-84 (1991)
(tracing the development of the discretionary function excpetion); Daniel E. Matthews, FederalTort Claims Act-The ProperScope of the DiscretionaryFunction Ex-
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some have nibbled at the edges,22 no commentator has addressed the
ex ante, normative question of who should bear the burden of proving
the FIFCA's jurisdictional conditions. Because the conditions attached
to the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity all operate to preclude the
exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction, courts should apply one
general rule for allocating the burden of proof. Yet, courts have inconsistently allocated the burden of proof for FTCA jurisdictional issues-sometimes imposing it on plaintiffs, sometimes on the United
States. 23 In the process, courts have rendered non-uniform an area of
FTCA law that ought to be driven by one approach to allocation.
This Article proposes a uniform rule for allocating the burden of
proving the jurisdictional conditions of the FTCA, a rule rooted in the
well-established distinction between the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion. Consistent with "waiver-of-sovereign-immunity" principles and general principles governing federal subject matter jurisdiction, the rule begins with the presumption that a federal
court does not have jurisdiction over a tort suit brought against the
United States. This "no-jurisdiction presumption" may be rebutted if
the allegations in the complaint, taken as a whole, suggest that the
plaintiff's suit is jurisdictionally viable. If the plaintiff overcomes the
ception, 6 Am. U. L. Rev. 22 (1957) (discussing the difficulties the federal courts have
had in construing the discretionary function exception); Cornelius J. Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 31 Wash. L. Rev. 207, 225-31 (1956) (proposing that for the discretionary
function excpetion to apply the government must prove that the employee (1) was
authorized to, and did, direct the act or omission, (2) was authorized to encounter the
risk involved, and (3) was in furtherance of a governmental objective); Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis: United States v.
Gaubert and the Resurrection of FederalSovereign Immunity, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev.
447, 448 (1997) (discussing the effects of Gaubert on the discretionary function exception); John M. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion", 57 Tul. L. Rev. 776, 83435 (1983) (suggesting that when agency action is challenged in tort suits, interpreting
the term "discretionary" should vary depending on the particular tort immunity context); Richard H. Seamon, Causation and the DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the
FederalTort Claims Act, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 691, 748-56 (1997) (proposing an "influence" test to determine whether the plaintiff's harm is based upon a discretionary
decision); Donald N. Zillman, ProtectingDiscretion: JudicialInterpretationof the DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the FederalTort Claims Act, 47 Me. L. Rev. 366, 367
(1995) (assessing discretionary function law under the FTCA fifty years after its enactment); Note, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the FederalTort ClaimsAct,
66 Harv. L. Rev. 488, 489 (1953) (indicating the inherent difficulty in applying the
discretionary function excpetion, delineating "most important factors," and suggesting possible analyses).
22. See Hankins, supra note 21, at 51-52 (reviewing case law that imposes the burden of proving the discretionary function exception on the United States, but not
commenting on whether such allocation is appropriate); Seamon, supra note 21, at
701-02 n.25 (recognizing the divergent views of who bears the burden of proof in
discretionary function cases, but providing no analysis of who should bear the
burden).
23. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing the different approaches to allocation in
cases involving the FTCA's statute of limitations and discretionary function exception, respectively).
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no-jurisdiction presumption, the United States thereafter bears the
burden of producing evidence that amounts to a prima facie case that
the plaintiff has failed to meet one of the Act's jurisdictional conditions. The government carries the burden of production because it
can best promote a timely resolution of the jurisdictional question.
The government must focus the factual and legal issues it believes
compel a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Once the
United States meets its burden of production, the ultimate burden of
persuasion rests with the plaintiff. The rule proposed here never imposes on the United States the burden of persuading a federal court
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an FTCA suit.
Part I of this Article discusses the threshold problem of Rule
12(b)(1) conversion. This part concludes that none of the reasons supporting Rule 12(b)(1) conversion is a viable justification for the practice in FTCA cases. Consistent with a recent Supreme Court
decision,2 4 this part argues that the United States is entitled to a Rule
12(b)(1) jurisdictional determination at the earliest stage of FTCA litigation. Only within this procedural context can the burden of proof
be appropriately allocated between the United States and FTCA
plaintiffs. Part II presents the allocation rule that should govern suits
brought pursuant to the FTCA and suggests that the rule accounts for
the policy considerations implicated when the government raises a jurisdictional condition as a bar to suit. Part IlH addresses potential criticisms of the allocation rule and concludes that none of the critiques
has merit. Finally, part IV applies the rule to selected jurisdictional
conditions of the FTCA. This part points out that some courts have
mistakenly imposed on the United States the ultimate burden of persuasion in cases involving the Act's statute of limitations and discretionary function exception. In applying the rule to the most
commonly litigated jurisdictional conditions, part IV concludes that
the United States should only bear the burden of production when
raising a condition as a jurisdictional bar to suit. The ultimate burden
of persuasion on jurisdictional issues must always remain with the
FTCA plaintiff.
I. THE

PROCEDURAL CONTEXT FIRST. MANIPULATING THE
BURDEN OF PROOF THROUGH THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.

Introduction: The Interplay Benveen Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56

Any discussion of the burden of proof applicable to the FTCA's
jurisdictional conditions must first consider the procedural context
within which burden allocation arises. This is because some courts
have applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner that
24. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012-15 (1998).
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fundamentally affects the burden of proving federal subject matter jurisdiction in FTCA cases. Accordingly, because the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure govern FTCA suits against the United States, this section first looks to the application of those rules to determine whether
burden-of-proof allocation comports both with basic principles of federal civil procedure and the jurisdictional scheme of the FTCA.
After a plaintiff files suit against the United States, the United
States-like any other defendant-may use a number of procedural
devices to resolve the suit short of trial. Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction;2 5 Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted;2 6 and Rule 56 entitles a
party to summary judgment if there are no disputed issues of material
fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.27 Under
Rule 12(b)(6), a ruling against the plaintiff results in dismissal of the
complaint, and under Rule 56, a ruling against the plaintiff results in
judgment for the defendant on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.2 8
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a ruling against the plaintiff means that she has
failed to plead or prove federal jurisdiction; it is not a judgment on the
merits.29
A party moving under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) can mount a
facial or factual attack on the court's jurisdiction. A facial attack is
just that-a challenge to the face of the complaint. For example, in
the FTCA context, the United States can seek a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal because the plaintiffs complaint fails to allege compliance with the
Act's administrative-claim requirement.30 Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
12(b)(6) facial attacks are treated similarly, with courts assuming that
the allegations in the complaint are true and then determining
whether the plaintiff has properly alleged jurisdiction or stated a claim
for relief. 31 A factual attack, however, is treated quite differently.
25. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
27. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
28. See, e.g., Kunkes v. United States, 78 F.3d 1549, 1550 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a summary judgment motion does not simply test
the sufficiency of the complaint; it involves an examination of the material outside the
complaint, and determines whether on the undisputed facts presented in that material, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Jama v. United States
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 361 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating
that a complaint must be dismissed under 12(b)(6) if the court finds "beyond doubt
that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief").
29. See, e.g., Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012-13 ("[When the lower federal court]
lack[s] jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for
the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.").
30. See infra Part IV.A.1.
31. See, e.g., Williamson v. Ticker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be on the face of the

complaint).
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When making a factual challenge, the United States argues that matters outside of the pleadings compel dismissal or a judgment in its
favor. Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court considers matters outside of the
pleadings to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), when the court considers matters outside of the
pleadings, the court converts the motion to a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56 to determine whether the facts are undisputed and, if so, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
The interplay between factual attacks under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
56 lies at the center of the burden-of-proof problems that arise in
FTCA litigation. In ruling on a Rule 56 motion, a federal district
court-which consults matters outside of the pleadings-indulges all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.32 The party
moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving that there
are no disputed issues of material fact.3 3 By contrast, when the government makes a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), it challenges the
non-moving party's right to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction.
The party claiming federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving the
right to be in federal court.3 A court, in ruling on a factual attack
under Rule 12(b)(1), consults matters outside of the pleadings, but, in
contrast to the standards governing Rule 56, does not give the benefit
of the doubt to the nonmoving party. 35 Rather, the court may weigh
conflicting evidence to determine whether the plaintiff has met her
burden of proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper.3
32. See, eg., Thomas v. IBM, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995) ("We examine the
factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to [the
party opposing] summary judgment.").
33. See, eg., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (stating that "a
party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of... demonstratfing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact").
34. See eg., Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884,891 (3d Cir.
1977) ("[T]he plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact

exist.").

35. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,735 & n.4 (1947); McCarthy v. United States,
850 F.2d 558,560 (9th Cir. 1988). In Dreierv. United States, however, the court stated:
[A]Ithough dismissal pursuant to the Feres doctrine properly should be labeled a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. RL Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
where the district court has properly considered items outside the complaint
in considering a motion to dismiss, the standard we apply upon de novo review of the record is similar to the summary judgment standard ....
106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1997).
36. See, eg., Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730,733
(9th Cir. 1979) ("Where the jurisdictional issue is separable from the merits of the
case, the judge may consider the evidence presented with respect to the jurisdictional
issue and rule on that issue, resolving factual disputes if necessary."); Mortensen, 549
F.2d at 891 (stating that "the trial court is free to weigh the evidence" and that the
plaintiff has the burden of proof that jurisdiction is proper); Sinclair v. Spatocco, 452
F.2d 1213, 1213 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The trial court has discretion to determine the jurisdictional facts itself."); Appelt v. Whitty, 286 F.2d 135, 137 (7th Cir. 1961) ("Disputed
issues of jurisdictional fact may be heard and determined by the Trial Court.").
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The different treatment extended to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56 explains in large part why Rule 56 judgments are rulings on the merits of
the underlying claim, whereas Rule 12(b)(1) rulings are not.
Unfortunately, courts often convert Rule 12(b)(1) motions into
Rule 56 motions for summary judgment. This practice of "Rule
12(b)(1) conversion" has significant consequences in the FTCA context because, consistent with Rule 56 standards, the United States, as
the moving party, bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact regarding jurisdiction.37 This conflicts
with the plaintiff's burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction
before the case can proceed to the merits. Accordingly, before
presenting the allocation rule that should govern FTCA jurisdictional
determinations, this section first takes a closer look at this practice of
conversion to determine whether it lays the proper procedural foundation for burden allocation in FTCA cases.
B.

The Shaky PillarsSupporting Rule 12(b)(1) Conversion in
FTCA Actions
Courts have justified Rule 12(b)(1) conversion on the ground that
Rule 56 standards should apply if the jurisdictional issues are "intertwined" with the underlying merits of the legal claim. 38 Although
every circuit court that has considered the question has endorsed the
intertwined standard in FTCA actions, 39 no court has paused to consider the threshold question of whether Rule 12(b)(1) conversion is
even appropriate in FTCA litigation. Indeed, neither the text of Rule
12(b)(1) nor the Committee Notes endorse the practice of converting
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
Courts that have converted Rule 12(b)(1) motions into Rule 56 motions have used the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss for failure to state a cognizable claim.4 0 The Committee Notes
37. See infra Part I.C.
38. See generally 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1350 (Supp. 1998) ("[U]pon a challenge to the court's jurisdiction by a
party, the court should conduct a careful inquiry and make a conclusive determination
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction or not, or at least defer the inquiry if it is
intertwined with the merits of the case.").
39. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 127 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
the intertwined standard); Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir.
1997) (same); Bennett v. United States, 102 F.3d 486, 488 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996) (same);
Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Davis v. United
States, 961 F.2d 53, 56 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); Redmon ex rel. Redmon v. United
States, 934 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d
1525, 1528-30 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); Tindall ex rel. Tindall, Jr. v. United States, 901
F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (same); Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d
799, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077
(9th Cir. 1983) (same); Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D.N.J. 1997)
(same): Fanoele v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D. Kan. 1997) (same);
Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 970 F. Supp. 855, 860-61 (D. Kan. 1997) (same).
40. Rule 12(b) states, in part:
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accompanying Rule 12 clearly state that when courts consider matters
outside of the pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, the standard
governing motions for summary judgment should be applied.4 There
is no mention in the text of the Rule or the Committee Notes, however, of a similar treatment for Rule 12(b)(1) motions.4 2
Nor could there be such similar treatment, lest Congress intended
to upset centuries of well-established principles of federal civil procedure. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1937, federal courts followed a fairly well-developed scheme for adjudicating motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Time and again, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to make
jurisdictional determinations in civil cases as soon as practicable, reversing district court decisions when jurisdictional determinations
were unjustifiably postponed4 3 or when lower courts overlooked the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction altogether.'" These early cases
If, on a motion assertingde defense mmbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added).
41. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 advisory committee's note.
42. See, e.g., Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 204 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987)
("When a court determines that the United States is immune from liability under the
FTCA, the proper disposition is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not
a grant of summary judgment."); Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 927-29 (7th

Cir. 1986) (holding that there is no support for Rule 12(b)(1) conversion in the Com-

mittee Notes); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469
F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[It is clear, under the last sentence in Rule 12(b), that
the only motion under this Rule which can be treated as a motion for summary judgment when outside matters are considered is that numbered (6), failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.").
43. See, eg., Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 325 (1889) (stating that if the record
before the court establishes that the court does not have jurisdiction, the court's -duty
is to proceed no further"); Blacklock v. Small, 127 U.S. 96, 105 (1888) (stating that the
lower court should not have dismissed the case on the merits, but rather for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); Hartog v. Memory, 116 U.S. 588,591 (1886) (holding that
as soon as a court is presented with evidence that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
the court "may stop all further proceedings and dismiss the suit"); Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209, 211 (1881) (holding that where jurisdiction of a court is called into
question, the court must "stop all further proceedings").
44. See, e.g., Morris, 129 U.S. at 325-26 (reversing the lower court's decision denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where evidence showed
lack of diversity); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 587-90 (1888) (holding that a
verdict for the plaintiff should be reversed because the lower court was without subject matter jurisdiction); King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225, 226 (1887)
(declining to address a non-jurisdictional issue on appeal where the record showed
that the lower court was without subject matter jurisdiction); Little v. Giles, 118 U.S.
596, 602-03 (1886) (reversing a lower court's denial of a petition for remand where
federal subject matter jurisdiction arose through the collusion of parties); Farmington
v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1885) (reversing a verdict for the plaintiff and remanding to the lower court with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
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never suggested that the non-jurisdiction-seeking party ever bears the
burden of proving a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or that the
jurisdiction-seeking party was entitled to any favorable procedural
presumptions.
Nonetheless, Rule 12(b)(1) conversion based upon the intertwined
standard is so woven into the fabric of FTCA litigation that the practice is accepted with little or no analysis. Yet, because of the important burden-shifting consequences of Rule 12(b)(1) conversion and
because of the importance of determining as soon as practicable the
federal district court's very power to hear a case, analytical silence
cannot be accepted. Courts should make jurisdictional determinations
pursuant to the traditional procedural standards of Rule 12(b)(1). In
light of the well-established historical practice of making jurisdictional
determinations at the earliest stage of civil litigation, and in light of
the codification of that practice in Rule 12(b)(1), it is somewhat surprising that courts would postpone jurisdictional determinations under
any circumstances or afford jurisdiction-seeking parties any favorable
presumptions. Indeed, in FTCA cases, the intertwined standard is a
potent tool in a plaintiff's litigation arsenal, for the standard permits a
plaintiff to proceed to the merits of her FTCA claim even when the
United States makes a strong, pre-trial evidentiary showing that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.
The reasons for using the intertwined standard for converting a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment
comprise the analytical pillars of the standard. There are four such
pillars. One would think that four pillars constitute a strong analytical
foundation, but these pillars fall, like a house of cards, under close
scrutiny.4 5 Indeed, an examination of the four rationales reveals that
none of them supports Rule 12(b)(1) conversion for FTCA jurisdictional challenges.
First, courts have been loath to deprive a plaintiff of having a jury
decide the merits of her legal claim, reasoning that a Rule 12(b)(1)
jurisdiction); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,
381-82 (1884) (reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the case was improperly
removed by the defendant to federal court); Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109
U.S. 278, 283-85 (1883) (reversing the judgment of the lower court and remanding for
a determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction existed); Williams, 104 U.S. at

211-12 (reversing jury verdict and remanding with directions to dismiss for want of
subject matter jurisdiction where evidence showed collusion between plaintiffs seeking to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 125, 125-26 (1804) (reversing a jury verdict for the defendant where diversity jurisdiction not established); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382, 383 (1798)

(vacating a jury verdict for the plaintiff where diversity jurisdiction was not
established).

45. A discussion of whether Rule 12(b)(1) conversion is ever appropriate is beyond the scope of this Article. We assume, solely for purposes of this Article, that the
four pillars are viable exceptions to the general rule that jurisdictional determinations

should be made at the earliest practicable time in civil litigation.
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jurisdictional determination that involved the resolution of merits issues improperly invades the province of the jury.4 6 The intertwined
standard, therefore, serves as a kind of jurisprudential buffer between
judge and jury, ensuring that each carries out its designated role in the
judicial process. In the FTCA context, however, the need for such a
"buffer" would seem to disappear altogether because the judge in an
FTCA action determines both jurisdiction and the merits of the underlying tort claim; there is no right to a jury trial. 47 Thus, a judge
deciding an FTCA jurisdictional issue that implicates merits questions
would not be overstepping any historically-drawn lines for judicial decision-making.
Second, courts have converted Rule 12(b)(1) motions into Rule 56
motions for summary judgment out of fear that the doctrine of res
judicata would deprive a party of a full adjudication on the merits of
her claim if adjudicated as part of a jurisdictional determination.4" In
its most basic sense, the doctrine of res judicata prevents a party from
relitigating a final judgment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.4 9 Under the FTCA, however, there is little danger that a court's
determination of a merits issue in deciding a threshold jurisdictional
question will unduly prejudice the plaintiff in subsequent litigation.
Once an FTCA action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic46. See, e.g., Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730,735
(9th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that "where the jurisdictional issue and the substantive issues are so intermeshed that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on decision of the merits, a party is entitled to have the jurisdictional issue submitted to the
jury"); Marks Food Corp. v. Barbara Ann Baking Co., 274 F.2d 934, 936 (9th Cir.
1959) (noting that "any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be
scrutinized with the utmost care"); Rhoades v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 623, 629
(D. Del. 1996) (interpreting the FICA).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994) ("Any action against the United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury .... "). See generally Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) ("When Congress has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States, it has almost always conditioned that waiver upon a plaintiff's relinquishing any claim to a jury trial."). In a clear misunderstanding of the
FTCA, one district court declined to make a Rule 12(b)(1) determination because the
court feared that the plaintiff would have to present the jurisdictional issue to the
judge and the merits to a "jury." See Rhoades, 950 F. Supp. at 629. The district court
went on to deny pre-trial relief because a "jury" could reasonably resolve merits issues in favor of the FTCA plaintiff. See id. at 631. The Rhoades court ignored 28
U.S.C. § 2402, which provides that FTCA actions are tried by judges, not juries.
48. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1130-31
(2d Cir. 1976) (noting that judgments under 12(b)(1) may deprive a party of judgment
on the merits of the case); Jama v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 361 (D.NJ. 1998) (stating that a dismissal under 12(b)(1) is not
given res judicata effect as to the merits of the case); Rhoades, 950 F. Supp. at 629
("[W]hen the jurisdictional issues are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the
cause of action, courts have not dismissed federal claims on rule 12(b)(1) motions
.");
Barnson v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 614, 618-19 (D. Utah 1982) (implying
that a 12(b)(1) motion provides less protection for a plaintiff than a judgment on the
merits).
49. See Black's Law Dictionary 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
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tion, the plaintiff's right to tort recovery against the United States is
foreclosed. The plaintiff cannot proceed in state court because state
courts do not have jurisdiction over the United States.50 Nor can the
plaintiff proceed in federal court because the FTCA is the only statute
that subjects the United States to tort liability. 5 '
Moreover, the court can give a plaintiff the opportunity to fully litigate merits issues that are essential to a jurisdictional determination at
a preliminary stage after sufficient discovery. In fact, courts are permitted to hold full evidentiary hearings on jurisdictional issues, including witness testimony subject to cross-examination.5
If courts
conclusively determine merits issues at the jurisdictional stage, the
plaintiff suffers no prejudice and loses no rights. If the court finds that
it does not have jurisdiction, the court saves itself and the parties from
litigating all of the merits issues which are not part of the jurisdictional
determination. If the court finds that it does have jurisdiction and
decides some of the merits issues in the process, the court either promotes settlement of the case or streamlines the ultimate trial. Rule
12(b)(1) front-loads the process and shifts the jurisdictional determination to the earliest stage of the proceeding. This result should surprise no one because such front-loading is the clear import of Rule
12(b)(1) and the historical practice that preceded the Rule's introduction into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.53 In FTCA cases, Rule
12(b)(1) surely does not serve as a sword used to emasculate a plaintiff's rights.
Third, courts have reasoned that a Rule 12(b)(1) conversion is appropriate when the same federal statute confers federal subject matter
jurisdiction and provides the plaintiff with substantive rights.5 4 This
organic interconnectedness requires applying summary judgment
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (stating that federal district courts have "exclusive jurisdiction" over tort claims brought against the United States).
51. Of course, after an adverse final judgment has been entered, an FTCA plaintiff can seek to re-open her FTCA action through Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing for post-judgment relief if the
moving party meets any one of six criteria). If a case is re-opened pursuant to Rule
60(b). the doctrine of res judicata has no impact on the "new" case. See Weldon v.
United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1995).
52. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that district court proceedings under Rule 12(b)(1) may weigh evidence in order to
arrive at a jurisdictional determination); Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.
1982) (holding that, where jurisdictional facts are disputed, the court "may ... go
beyond the allegations of the complaint and in an evidentiary hearing determine if
there are facts to support the jurisdictional allegations").
53. See, e.g., Ford v. American Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1985)
(affirming the district court's Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal in an FTCA action and concluding "[t]he merits and the jurisdictional issue were not so intermeshed as to prevent the
separate consideration and decision of the jurisdiction question, albeit that decision is
based in large measure on facts relevant to the merits." (citation omitted)).
54. See, e.g., Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891-92 (3d
Cir. 1977) (interpreting the Sherman Act); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597, 608-12 (9th Cir. 1976) (same).
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standards because an element essential to the merits of a claim is precisely the same element implicated in the jurisdictional determination.
Courts have concluded that because the FTCA confers jurisdiction on
federal district courts and, at the same time, gives plaintiffs the right to
assert a tort claim against the United States, the jurisdictional and
merits issues are necessarily intertwined.15 The argument represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the FTCA's liability scheme. Un56
like federal statutes that have come under the intertwined umbrella,
the FTCA on its face does not prescribe the substantive elements of a
FTCA claim. Rather, state law governs the particulars of the underlying tort claim,57 and the FTCA itself prescribes the jurisdictional prerequisites to suit in federal district court. Of course, as a practical
matter, jurisdictional issues may sometimes overlap with merits issues
in the FITCA context. But, this does not result in any undue prejudice
to the FTCA plaintiff. The plaintiff still has a full opportunity to litigate the issue before the only fact-finder the plaintiff will ever have,
the court. Thus, at its core, the argument for Rule 12(b)(1) conversion
where the same statute confers jurisdiction and substantive rights really is not an independent reason for conversion at all.
The final reason for using the intertwined standard is the efficiency
rationale, a justification that courts have not explicitly suggested, but
one that no doubt drives Rule 12(b)(1) conversions in many instances.58 The practice of Rule 12(b)(1) conversion is efficient, so the
argument goes, because, rather than try the jurisdictional issues separately from the merits issues, the overlap of the two makes it prudent
to determine the jurisdictional and merits questions in one adjudication-at the time of trial when the court decides the merits. In the
FTCA context, Rule 12(b)(1) conversion requires courts to assume
jurisdiction over the FTCA claim pending a determination of the merits of the action, a jurisdictional assumption that some courts have

55. See, e.g., Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1997)
("[R]esolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case was intertwined with the merits."

(citation omitted)); Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting
that, under the FTCA, the jurisdictional and merits issues are intertwined); Cizek v.

United States, 953 F.2d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); Leslie v. United States,
986 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D.NJ. 1997) (same); Fanoele v. United States, 975 F. Supp.
1394, 1397 (D. Kan. 1997) (same); Franklin Say. Corp. v. United States, 970 F. Supp.

855, 860-61 (D. Kan. 1997) (same); Cupit v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 1104, 1107
(W.D. La. 1997) (same); Rhoades v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 623, 628-29 (D. Del.
1996) (same).
56. See supra note 55.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994) (holding the United States liable for the tort to
the same extent as a private person within the locality in which the tortious act or
omission occurred).

58. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981) (-Judicial
economy is best promoted when the existence of a federal right is directly reached
and, where no claim is found to exist, the case is dismissed on the merits.").
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stated explicitly in their opinions.5 9 Assuming jurisdiction over a

FTCA claim in this manner is tantamount to infecting FTCA litigation
with the constitutionally bizarre doctrine of "hypothetical
jurisdiction."
The doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction suffers from at least two
doctrinal deficiencies. To begin with, the doctrine is fundamentally
inconsistent with the constitutionally based principle that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. There is a well-established
presumption that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction unless a plaintiff affirmatively shows otherwise.6" When a federal
district court assumes jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case, that
court proceeds as if a plaintiff does not bear any burden whatsoever to
establish that she is entitled to a federal forum. The doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction logically cannot be squared with the limited-jurisdiction principle because the doctrine relieves a plaintiff of the burden
of proving subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction violates the separation of powers doctrine because it permits the judiciary to assert
jurisdiction over a case for efficiency purposes, rather than for constitutional or statutory reasons. In cases implicating a federal statute,
such as the FCA, a federal court is bound by congressionally defined
limits of jurisdiction. The principle of hypothetical jurisdiction is a
judicially created rule of efficiency that simply cannot trump legislatively created conditions governing federal subject matter jurisdiction.6 Hypothetical jurisdiction, therefore, cannot survive a
separation-of-powers analysis, regardless of one's theory of the separation doctrine.62
59. See Rhoades, 950 F. Supp. at 629; Barnson v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 614,
619 (D. Utah 1982). See generally Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (lth Cir.
1990) (stating that where jurisdictional issues are intertwined with merits issues,
courts should assume jurisdiction and proceed to decide the merits); Carmichael v.
United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Ordinarily, when a Rule
12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge attacks the merits of the underlying claim, the proper
procedure is to find jurisdiction and then treat the challenge on the merits as a motion
for summary judgment."); Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415-16 (indulging a Rule 12(b)(1)
conversion and assuming jurisdiction in a securities case).
60. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
61. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998).
62. As Professor Werhan has pointed out, the Supreme Court has endorsed essentially two theories of the separation of powers-formalism and functionalism. See
Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2681, 2681-83
(1996). For a formalist, governmental functions should be strictly separated so that
the powers of each branch of government are clearly demarcated. See Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). A violation of the separation of powers occurs, for
example, when actors within one branch of government step out of their narrowly
defined category and carry out functions reserved for another branch of government.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-56 (1983). By contrast, the functionalist focuses
less on rigid categories of governmental functions and more on the pragmatic, realworld problem of efficient government operation. See Werhan, supra, at 2685. Functionalism sanctions innovative action when such action prevents one branch from in-
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If lacking a sound doctrinal basis is not reason enough to reject the
concept of hypothetical jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has recently
rejected the principle outright. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,6 3 the Supreme Court decided the question of whether
the merits of a statutory cause of action could be decided before the
jurisdictional issue of the plaintiff's Article I standing. The Court
concluded that jurisdiction must be decided first:
Much more than legal niceties are at stake here. The statutory and
(especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential
ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the
courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from
acting permanently regarding certain subjects. For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction
to do so is, by very definition,
64
for a court to act ultra vires.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court disapproved the practice among
some lower courts of assuming jurisdiction where a merits question
was considered easy: 65 "We decline to endorse such an approach,"
reasoned the Court, "because it carries the courts beyond the bounds
of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles
of separation of powers. ' 66 The Court stated that assuming jurisdiction to proceed to a merits question "produces nothing more than a
hypothetical judgment-which comes to the same thing as an advisory
opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning."'67
Steel Co. has already cut a deep and wide path through federal law,
with courts now emphasizing the importance of deciding subject mat-

ter jurisdiction before anything else. 68 The question, then, is whether

terfering with another branch's "constitutionally assigned functions." Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
Hypothetical jurisdiction is not supportable under either theory. For the formalist,
assuming jurisdiction to proceed to merits questions offends the separation of powers
because an Article III court is defining the limits of its own jurisdiction, a job reserved
for the Congress. Nor does the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction find refuge in the
functionalist camp; for assuming jurisdiction is not an attempt to protect the judiciary
from encroachments from either the Executive or Legislative branches. Rather, the
doctrine is a judge-made tool for promoting judicial efficiency.
63. 118 S. Ct. 1003.
64. Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).
65. See id. at 1012.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).
68. See Gold v. Local 7 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d
1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Although Steel addresses standing in the context of a
federal question claim, its rationale must certainly apply-with even greater force-to
questions of supplemental jurisdiction, which implicate additional concerns of federalism and comity."); Williams v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266,
268 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Before we discuss either the facts or the law relevant to [the]
appeal, however, we must discuss two issues related to our appellate jurisdiction."
(citation omitted)); McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 158 F.3d 1294, 1298
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the prior practice of assuming jurisdiction and holding that
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Steel Co. instructs courts to refrain from converting Rule 12(b)(1) motions into Rule 56 motions for summary judgment in FTCA cases.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. did not address
the propriety of Rule 12(b)(1) conversion, the decision certainly casts
serious doubt on justifying the intertwined standard for reasons of judicial efficiency. In the wake of Steel Co., courts are already beginning to rescue Rule 12(b)(1) from its previous second-class
treatment. 69 In the end, postponing a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional determination for purposes of efficiency amounts to an endorsement of

Steel Co. stands for the proposition that "we must resolve all jurisdictional questions
before proceeding to the merits"); United States v. Webb, 157 F.3d 451, 453 (6th Cir.
1998) (declining to endorse the prior practice of assuming the appellate jurisdiction
even though appellant did not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)); Iglesias v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1998) (deciding first whether counterclaims
may be heard under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction or by some independent
jurisdictional basis); Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d 741, 747 (8th Cir. 1998) ("If
Mandanici does not have standing, then this court does not have jurisdiction to decide
any other issues raised on appeal." (citation omitted)); Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276,
287 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Steel Co. stands for the proposition that federal courts
are prohibited "from deciding on the merits any case over which they lack subject
matter jurisdiction" (citation omitted)); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Services Corp., 145
F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir.) (holding that, after Steel Co., courts "must 'spend ... time
and energy puzzling over the correct answer to an intractable jurisdictional matter,'
even if we think that the substantive merits are easily disposed of by well-settled law"
(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 539 (1998); Hardemon v. City of Boston,
144 F.3d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1998) (declining "to test the outer limits of the Court's
tolerance" and deciding the amount-in-controversy jurisdictional question first even
though the City "easily prevails on the merits" (citation omitted)); East Bay Mun.
Util. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("Nonetheless, the more cautious approach is first to tackle the government's theory
on the limits of the immunity waiver."); Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co., 142
F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the court is obliged to consider the mootness issue before anything else); Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372
n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that subject matter jurisdiction should not
be decided first because the jurisdictional issues are difficult and complex); Ramcor
Servs. Group, Inc. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 264, 266 (1998) ("[T]he court had
intended to apply the principle of hypothetical jurisdiction and decide this case without addressing the [difficult] jurisdictional question.... However, the Supreme Court
has recently rejected the principle of hypothetical jurisdiction, see Steel Co.....
thereby requiring the court to address an important jurisdictional question ....
(citation omitted)). But cf. Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., 119 S. Ct. 1563 (1999) (holding
that it is permissible for courts on some cases to decide questions of personal jurisdiction before questions of subject matter jurisdiction).
69. See, e.g., Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
district court erred in addressing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion before a Rule 12(b)(1) motion); Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (S.D. Iowa 1998) ("Defendants' 12(b)(1) defense must be addressed at the outset [i.e., before the Rule
12(b)(6) motion] because jurisdictional issues, whether raised sua sponte or by motion, are a barrier to a court's further consideration of the substantive issues in a
case." (footnote omitted)); Hayden v. New York Stock Exch., 4 F. Supp. 2d 335, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion before a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "to
preserve the prohibition against advisory opinions as a meaningful limitation upon the
power of the federal judiciary").
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the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court in
Steel Co. suggested that the concept violates the separation of powers.
C. Why Rule 12(b)(1) Offers the Appropriate Methodology for
Determining Subject Matter Jurisdiction and
Burden Allocation
If there is no principled basis to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to a
Rule 56 motion, courts should not convert the motion for conversion's
sake; that would be, as Justice Scalia has colorfully put it, a judicial
"drive-by" jurisdiction.7" Jurisdictional determinations were designed
for Rule 12(b)(1) treatment so that federal district courts can enjoy
wide latitude to hear evidence or engage in any other fact-finding that
convinces them that subject matter jurisdiction is present or is lacking.
Rule 56, by contrast, with its evidentiary presumptions and its requirement that the non-moving party only show a genuine issue of material
fact, circumscribes the court's power to determine jurisdiction at an
early
stage in the proceedings. Therefore, it is simply incorrect to
minimize
(or, more accurately, to trivialize) the differences between
Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56.
Most importantly, with respect to the issues raised in this Article,
Rule 12(b)(1) conversion dramatically changes the burden-of-proof
dynamics in the FTCA context.7 ' In effect, Rule 12(b)(1) conversion
lessens the burden, making it easier for a FTCA plaintiff to avoid an
adverse jurisdictional ruling and proceed to the merits of her tort action. Instead of having to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the federal court has jurisdiction, under Rule 56, the plaintiff
need only prove that there is an issue of material fact on a jurisdictional matter, and the district judge is required to indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 72 In fact, under Rule 56, the
burden is on the government to show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fmally, rather than promoting efficiency, Rule 12(b)(1) conversion
actually wastes scarce judicial resources because it permits FTCA
plaintiffs-who might lose a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional determination-to avoid summary judgment by offering a court just enough evidence to raise a factual issue. Suppose a FTCA plaintiff sues the
United States on the ground that the United States negligently contaminated her groundwater. The government, contending that the
70. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1011.
71. See, eg., Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that distinguishing between Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56 has "procedural ramifications," one of which includes the differing burdens of proof); Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) ("When subject matter jurisdiction is
challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion. On
the other hand, under Rule 12(b)(6) the defendant has the burden of showing no

claim has been stated." (citation omitted)).
72. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
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plaintiff's claim is barred by the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations, moves to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1).7 3 Assume the court decides to convert the motion to Rule 56, reasoning that the FTCA provides for both jurisdiction and substantive rights and that the merits are intertwined with the
jurisdictional determination. Now, suppose the limitations issue turns
on whether the plaintiff knew of the contamination more than two
years before she filed her administrative claim with the relevant federal agency. The United States then offers an affidavit from a government official which states that he told the plaintiff that the
groundwater was contaminated more than two years before she filed
the claim. The government also submits a phone record showing that
the official called the plaintiff on a certain date. In response to the
motion, the plaintiff fies an affidavit, saying that she was not informed
of the contamination at that time.
Under Rule 56, the court's hands are tied. The plaintiff's affidavit,
unless incompetent, 4 raises an issue of material fact regarding
whether the plaintiff knew of the contamination more than two years
before filing her claim. The case must proceed to trial, and the parties
will present evidence on all of the issues, 75 including statute of limitations, negligence, causation, and damages. If the court proceeds
under Rule 12(b)(1), however, there might be a very different, more
efficient, outcome. Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court can weigh the evidence and decide whether the government official or the plaintiff is
correct on the crucial fact of notice. If the court finds that the government official's testimony is more credible, it will dismiss the case without wasting any resources involved in determining negligence,
causation, and damages.
By proceeding under Rule 56, a federal district court may conclude,
at the end of the trial, that it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
FTCA claim in the first place. There are several reported cases in
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18
(1979). For a more detailed discussion of why the FTCA's statute of limitations is
jurisdictional, see infra Part IV.B.1.
74. One of the only ways the United States could get around the plaintiff's affidavit is to argue that it represents an attempt to create a "sham" issue of fact. See, e.g.,
Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that when an affidavit
is proffered at the summary judgment stage and that affidavit contradicts prior deposition testimony, courts should "disregard [the] contrary affidavit [if the affidavit]...
constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact issue").
75. Of course, a court can bifurcate the trial and hear the statute-of-limitations
issue first. However, district courts rarely bifurcate FTCA actions because witnesses
who must testify on the limitations questions must also testify on merits issues, so that
it would be self-evidently inefficient to call a witness for limitations purposes, hold
that the suit is timely, and have to re-call that same witness for merits issues. See, e.g.,
Marks Food Corp. v. Barbara Ann Baking Co., 274 F.2d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1959) ("It
seems to us that a safe practice would be never to separate the subject matter jurisdiction issue for separate trial in cases where the factual merits of the case must be
considered in deciding the separated issue.").
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which the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over an FTCA
claim after conducting a complete trial on the merits of an FTCA
plaintiff's claims.76 This is a patent waste of resources; the plaintiff,
the United States, and the court have all squandered their time and
money by dealing with issues that ultimately had no bearing on the
outcome of the case. Not only is the inefficiency of this scheme selfevident, but it also turns on its head the notion that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction.
D.

Conclusions

We have attempted to unravel the underpinnings of the intertwined
standard to determine whether converting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction into a Rule 56 motion
for summary judgment is appropriate in the FTCA context. This Article undertakes this important task at the outset because Rule 12(b)(1)
conversion, if accepted, fundamentally affects how one allocates the
burden proving jurisdiction in FTCA cases. None of the reasons that
support applying the intertwined standard in other contexts are persuasive justifications for importing the standard into FTCA litigation.
If there is no sound justification for Rule 12(b)(1) conversion, then
courts should not do it.
In short, Rule 12(b)(1) requires a federal district court-before exposing the parties to time-consuming and expensive discovery on nonjurisdictional matters-to hear evidence on the jurisdictional issue,
make credibility determinations (if necessary), and decide as early as
possible whether Congress has consented to suit under the facts and
circumstances presented. Any other conclusion produces the anomalous and inefficient result that a district court may conclude, only after
an adjudication of the merits, that it lacked jurisdiction over the
FTCA claim in the first instance. Therefore, when the United States
brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, district courts should remain within the 12(b)(1) framework, for it is only within that crucible that the burden of proving the
FTCA jurisdictional conditions can be properly allocated.

76. See, e.g., Scruggs v. United States, 959 F. Supp. 1537, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(finding the discretionary function exception applicable after trial); O'Neill v. United

States, 927 F. Supp. 599, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding the independent contractor
exception applicable after trial); Prescott v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 1461, 1471 (D.

Nev. 1994) (finding the discretionary function exception applicable after trial and
appeal).
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UNIFORM RULE FOR ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF

PROVING THE JURISDICTIONAL CONDITIONS OF
THE FTCA

A.

The Rule: DistinguishingBetween the Burden of Persuasionand
the Burden of Production

We now turn to the burden-of-proof rule that should govern motions to dismiss FTCA suits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We

propose that the burden of proving the jurisdictional conditions of the
Act should be allocated according to the following scheme:
1. The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that give rise to
federal subject matter jurisdiction.
2. The United States bears the burden of producing evidence that
amounts to a prima facie case that the FTCA claim is jurisdictionally barred.
3. The plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of persuading a federal
district court that it has subject matter jurisdiction over an
FTCA claim.
Prong 1 is simply a rule of pleading for a plaintiff to initially overcome a presumption that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, so we shall refer to Prong 1 as establishing a "no-jurisdiction
presumption."77 This is not, however, the traditional evidentiary presumption that has troubled commentators since the nineteenth century.7" Ordinarily, the debate surrounding presumptions centers on
whether a presumption is enduring or may be extinguished with the
introduction of evidence in a substantive cause of action. In 1898, for
example, Professor Thayer described a presumption as a "bursting
bubble," which disappears from a case once evidence is produced that
rebuts the presumption.79 Justice Lamm of the Missouri Supreme
Court later described a "presumption" as follows: "Presumptions...
may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but
disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts.""0 This Article does not
engage in a discussion of whether bats and bursting bubbles should be
incorporated into a burden-allocation scheme for the FTCA. Happily,
the presumption proposed here operates much more simply and can
be described much less poetically.
In the context of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the no-jurisdiction presumption requires federal courts to infer
77. See infra Part II.B.2.
78. See, e.g., 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 344, at 460-76 (attempting
to reconcile discrepant uses of the term "presumption"); Prosser & Keeton, supra
note 8, § 38, at 240 & n.14 (discussing the lingering disagreement over the meaning of
the word "presumption").
79. See Thayer, supra note 4, at 346.
80. Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R., Co., 94 S.W. 256,
262 (Mo. 1906) (quoting an unnamed attorney).
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that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking unless a plaintiffs allegations
successfully rebut the presumption. The no-jurisdiction presumption
can be overcome if the face of an FTCA complaint reveals that the
cause of action is jurisdictionally viable, thereby complying with Rule
8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."1 A plaintiff need not
allege that each and every jurisdictional condition has been satisfied.
That is to say, the proposed allocation rule does not require FTCA
plaintiffs to provide a laundry list of affirmative allegations that addresses all of the jurisdictional conditions found within the Act. Often
the reality is that plaintiffs are not quite sure whether a tort claim is
barred, for example, by the discretionary function exception or
whether the claim accrued more than two years before an administrative claim was filed with the appropriate federal agency. 2 On the
other hand, an FTCA plaintiff can affirmatively plead compliance with
the FTCA's mandatory administrative-exhaustion scheme because she
will know whether she has filed an administrative claim with the relevant federal agency.83
Construed in this manner, the no-jurisdiction presumption in Prong
1 is unlike many presumptions, which come into legal existence only
when a party produces evidence or law that entities that party to a
presumption.' 4 This is because of the uniqueness of the no-jurisdiction presumption: it prevents Article III courts from acting unconstitutionally, that is, without a statutory or constitutional basis for
adjudicating the rights and liabilities of the parties. At the same time,
the no-jurisdiction presumption enures to the benefit of the non-jurisdiction-seeking party. The jurisdiction-seeking party must overcome a
presumption even though the party that opposes a finding of jurisdiction has not presented the court wvith any facts entitling it to the presumption; it exists by operation of law because the FTCA plaintiff
seeks to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction.
An Article III court's inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction by no
means ends if an FTCA plaintiff overcomes the no-jurisdiction presumption. A party surely cannot plead her way into federal court; the
pleadings must stand the test of proof. The United States, of course,
may challenge the plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction. Prong 2 of the
allocation rule shifts the burden of production to the United States
when the government asserts a factual attack to the plaintiff's allegation of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the United
States is required to produce evidence that makes a prima facie case
81. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief...
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's

jurisdiction depends .... ").
82. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2680(a) (1994).
83. See id. § 2675(a).
84. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 n.3 (1993) (discussing the burden allocation scheme for itle VII discriminatory treatment cases).
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that the plaintiff's claim is barred by one of the Act's jurisdictional
conditions. The government makes out a prima facie case if there is a
logical connection between the elements of the jurisdictional condition and the evidence produced by the government." Allocating the
burden of proof in this manner reflects the realities of motion practice
in the federal courts. Indeed, the United States is not likely to file a
cursory motion to dismiss that simply states, without supporting evidence, that a plaintiff's tort claim is jurisdictionally defective in fact.
The government has every incentive to produce as much evidence as
possible to persuade the trier of fact (the court) that the claim is jurisdictionally barred.86
Finally, if an FTCA plaintiff overcomes the no-jurisdiction presumption and the United States meets its burden of producing evidence that the plaintiff has failed to meet a jurisdictional condition of
the FTCA, Prong 3 imposes on the plaintiff the ultimate burden of
persuading the federal district court that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the tort claim. Prong 3 is simply a logical extension of Prong
1. Because Article III courts presume that they do not have jurisdiction, it follows that, in the last analysis, the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that subject matter jurisdiction is
proper. When the United States has satisfied its burden of production, an FTCA plaintiff will be faced with a prima facie case that her
claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In
this situation, the plaintiff will have two choices. First, the plaintiff
may challenge the probity of the evidence the government produced.
The plaintiff might, for example, argue that the facts produced by the
United States do not compel a conclusion that the claim is jurisdictionally barred. Second, the plaintiff may wish to produce her own
evidence suggesting that the claim is jurisdictionally viable. Although
the plaintiff may want to produce her own evidence, Prong 3 of the
proposed rule does not impose that requirement on the plaintiff as a
matter of law. The risk of non-persuasion is on the plaintiff, and she
must make the judgment call of whether to challenge the United
States' evidence, produce her own evidence, or proceed using both
methods of attacking the government's position.
Distinguishing between the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion is the central feature of the proposed allocation rule.
85. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12
(1996) (adopting a similar construction for cases arising under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act); 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 338, at 433 ("The
evidence must be such that a reasonable person could draw from it the inference of
the existence of the particular fact to be proved . . ").
86. Cf. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)
("[A]lthough the defendant does not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that the employment
decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant normally will attempt to prove the factual

basis for its explanation.").
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Neither the text of the FTCA nor its legislative history, however, prescribe this type of burden-allocation scheme for the jurisdictional conditions of the Act. At the same time, Congress enacted the FTCA
against a background of common-law principles governing burden-ofproof allocation, and well-settled principles of statutory construction
require courts to look to this background to ascertain congressional
intent. 87 The critical question, therefore, is whether the allocation
scheme is consistent with the purposes of the FTCA and the commonlaw rules of burden allocation in existence at the time the FTCA was
enacted. Accordingly, the next section locates the meaning of the burdens of persuasion and production at common law and discusses how
the rule accounts for the policies implicated when allocating the burden of proving the FTCA's jurisdictional conditions.

1.

B. The Rule Justified
The Burden of Persuasion and the Burden of Production
Defined at Common Law

Like many other phrases in our legal lexicon, onus probandi, Latin
for "burden of proof," has assumed many-perhaps too manymeanings. The uncertainty surrounding the burden-of-proof concept
has plagued the law of evidence for some time now, prompting Professor Thayer to comment more than a century ago that "the student of
that subject needs to reflect carefully on these ambiguities, to perceive
the bearing of them, and to have a clear mind about.., the burden of
proof ....
,,I Yet, after more than a century of careful reflection and
numerous attempts at academic mind clearing, commentators have yet
to agree upon the theoretical and policy bases of the burden of proof
or the method for allocating it.8 9 Professor McCormick has offered a
five-part allocation rule; 90 Professor Greenleaf proposed allocating
87. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 308 (1992) (noting that no

basis exists "for assuming that Congress was unaware of established tort definitions
when it enacted the Tort Claims Act"); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 526-28
(1973) (arguing for adherence to Congress's choice not to leave to the states the determination of for whose negligence the government is liable); Reo v. United States
Postal Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that in adopting the FTCA, "Congress was legislating against the background of the 'ancient precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence' (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir.
1978))).
88. Thayer, supra note 4, at 354.
89. See supra note 2.
90. See 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 337, at 432. Professor McCormick has said:
In summary, there is no key principle governing the apportionment of the
burdens of proof. Their allocation, either initially or ultimately, will depend
upon the weight that is given to any one or more of several factors, including: (1) the natural tendency to place the burdens on the party desiring
change, (2) special policy considerations such as those disfavoring certain
defenses, (3) convenience, (4) fairness, and (5) the judicial estimate of the
probabilities.
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the burden of proof according to whether proof of a negative or proof
of the affirmative is required; 9 and Professors Hay, Spier, and
Sanchirico have offered a law and economics model of burden allocation for civil litigation.92
This section does not attempt to wade through the minefield of theoretical constructs that have been the subject of academic commentary. Nor do we seek to add yet another formulation of what the
burden of proof is or should be, for it is clear to us that burden-ofproof "theory," much like conflict-of-law doctrine, has been a "veritable playpen" 93 for commentators seeking to impose a uniform theoretical framework on burden allocation in all of civil litigation. On a
conceptual level, courts and everyday practitioners know very well
what the burden of proof means and how it should be allocated in a
particular legal and factual context. For example, plaintiffs bear the
burden of proving their causes of action and defendants bear the burden of proving affirmative defenses. 4 In those cases in which it appears "unfair" (from either a policy or evidentiary standpoint) to
impose the ultimate burden of proof on one of the parties, courts will
normally
shift at least some part of the burden of proof onto the other
95
party.
This latter practice of shifting part of the burden of proof is the key
to unlocking the burden-of-proof problems that arise when a jurisdictional condition of the FTCA is raised as a reason for dismissing an
FTCA claim. In general, attempts to resolve the burden-allocation
conundrum have largely focused on splicing the burden of proof into
two distinct, yet critically important categories: the burden of persuasion and the burden of production. The burden of persuasion is perhaps most commonly associated with the notion that a party bears the
"burden of proof." The burden of persuasion is simply the burden of
persuading a trier of fact that the law and the disputed facts together
compel a particular conclusion. 96 The burden of persuasion does not

shift; it remains on the party who carries that burden at the beginning
of the case. 97 On the other hand, although one party generally will

Id. (citation omitted).
91. See 1 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 74, at 113 n.(a)
(15th ed. 1892).
92. See Hay & Spier, supra note 2; Sanchirico, supra note 2.
93. Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 551 (W. Va. 1986).
94. See generally Prosser & Keeton, supra note 8, §§ 38, 65, at 239, 451 (discussing
the basic principles of tort burdens).
95. See supra note 1.
96. See 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 336, at 425.

97. See id. § 336, at 426 ("[The burden of persuasion] does not shift from party to
party during the course of the trial simply because it need not be allocated until it is
time for a decision.").
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shoulder both the burdens of persuasion and production,9" the burden
of production does sometimes shift from party to party. Unlike the
burden of persuasion, the burden of production is much more limited
in its effect. A party bearing the burden of production need not prove
that the facts as a whole compel some conclusion, but rather that the
facts produced, if undisputed, require a particular legal result. 9 The
burden of production asks whether the party who bears that burden is
entitled
to have the trier of fact decide the ultimate issue in the
oo
case.1

Historically, the distinction between the burden of persuasion and
the burden of production was a means of allocating decision-making
power between the judge and the jury. 10 1 The burden of production,
for example, was thought to concern a party's duty to a judge, namely,
to produce evidence that satisfies the judge that a particular fact exists. 1" By contrast, the burden of persuasion was viewed as a tool for
the jury, who must decide who wins if the evidence is in a state of
equipoise."°3 Notwithstanding its historical roots, however, distinguishing between the burdens of persuasion and production is just as
useful a guide for burden allocation in cases tried by a court; precisely
the same considerations of persuasion and production arise when a
judge is the trier of fact."°
The twin burdens of persuasion and production are not modem inventions but are deeply rooted in the common law. Distinguishing
between them dates back to at least the early nineteenth century,
when Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court first
introduced the distinction in the 1832 case of Powers v.Russell. s
Professor Thayer later explained the importance of dividing the burden of proof into considerations of persuasion and production, emphasizing the different consequences associated with failing to meet a
burden of persuasion versus a burden of production." Other late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century commentators, reviewing English and American decisions, joined Professor Thayer in
98. See id§ 337, at 427 ("In most cases, the party who has the burden of pleading
a fact will have the burdens of producing evidence and of persuading the jury of its
existence as well." (citation omitted)).
99. See id.§ 336, at 425 ("The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the
liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on
the issue has not been produced.").
100. See Sprung, supra note 2, at 1305 ("Today, the burden of production asks
whether a party has proved the existence or nonexistence of a fact sufficient to bring
the dispute before the trier of fact.").
101. See 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 336, at 425.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 425 & n.4.
104. See id at 425-26.
105. 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 69, 76 (1832).
106. See Thayer, supra note 4, at 355.
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this understanding of the burden of proof."° Indeed, by 1946-the
year the FTCA was enacted-the common law was firmly grounded in
the view that the burden of proof consisted of a non-shifting burden of
persuasion that was established at the beginning of a case and a shifting burden of production that arose later in a case.10 1
Under what circumstances are the burdens of persuasion and production shifted? Although there are no hard-and-fast rules of thumb
that govern burden-shifting in all circumstances, there appears to be
general agreement over a few basic principles. The burden of persuasion normally remains with the party who must plead an issue, except
when another party controls information that, in fairness, puts that
party in a better position to prove the issue in question."0 9 This principle finds its most celebrated expression in the famous (or, more accurately, infamous) case of Summers v. Tice.110 There, the California
Supreme Court shifted the ultimate burden of proving causation onto
two negligent defendants, each of whom fired a bullet in the plaintiff's
direction, because the plaintiff was unable to prove which defendant's
bullet actually struck him. According to the Summers court:
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results
that would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of
the defendants only, a requirement that the burden of proof on that
subject be shifted to defendants becomes manifest. They are both
wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff. They brought about a
107. See, e.g., W.M. Best, The Principles of the Law of Evidence, § 265 (3d Am. ed.
1908) (stating that the term burden of proof "fails to convey a precise idea"); 1
Greenleaf, supra note 91, § 74, at 113, n.(a) (arguing that "it is by no means safe to
infer that because the party has the burden of meeting the prima facie case,

. . .

he

must have the preponderance of the evidence"); 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in
Trials at Common Law §§ 2486-2487, at 287-99 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981)
(identifying and distinguishing between the two meanings of burden of proof).
108. See Webre Steib Co. v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1945); Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104,110-11 (1941); Brosnan v. Brosnan, 263 U.S. 345, 349 (1923); Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 594-95 (1923);
see also Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Dep't of Labor v.
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276 (1994) (interpreting the term "burden of
proof' in the Administrative Procedures Act, which was passed in 1946, and concluding that the term referred to the burden of persuasion).
109. See, e.g., 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 337, at 429 ("A doctrine
often repeated by the courts is that where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving the issue.");
Hay & Spier, supra note 2, at 419 (arguing that a party in control of information
should bear the burden of proof to minimize costs to parties).
The classic exception to this general principle is the burden of proof applicable to
the defense of contributory negligence. The burden of persuasion is on the defendant
because the defendant must plead the issue as an affirmative defense. However, because the plaintiff is in the best position to know whether her actions in some way
contributed to her damage, the plaintiff may have the burden of "producing evidence
and persuasion with regard to that issue." 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4,
§ 337, at 428.
110. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
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situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff,
hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can.111
A Summers-type shift in the burden of persuasion, therefore, may be
appropriate if imposing a burden of persuasion on an injured plaintiff
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for that party to prevail because the tortfeasor possesses the critical evidence. The burden of
production, by contrast, traditionally shifts depending on the ebb and
flow of the evidence, representing a sort of evidentiary tennis match in
which adversaries present a court or trier of fact with competing ver112
sions of the facts that purportedly compel a particular legal result.
Unlike a shift in the burden of persuasion for policy reasons-as in
Summers-the burden of production shifts because it gives courts a
relatively rigorous evidentiary framework
within which to determine
13
the rights and liabilities of the parties.'
2. The Rule and the Policies Implicated when Allocating the
Burden of Proving the FTCA's Jurisdictional Conditions
Because a non-shifting burden of persuasion and a shifting burden
of production were fixtures of the common law at the time the FTCA
was enacted, courts should conclude that importing the distinction
into the FTCA does not offend congressional intent. At the same
time, the twin burdens should not be allocated in a jurisprudential
vacuum; allocation depends upon the policies implicated in any given
legal context. Neither courts nor commentators have identified the
policies that circumscribe the burden of proving the FTCA's jurisdictional conditions. There are three. First, jurisdictional determinations
are made in the Rule 12(b)(1) context and early in a case, so an allocation rule should promote an expeditious and efficient resolution of the
jurisdictional question. 14 Second, because all FTCA actions must be
brought in federal court, 1 5 an allocation rule should account for the
well-established principle that federal courts are courts of limited ju111. Id. at 4.
112. See, e.g., 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 338, at 437 (outlining
three stages before the burden shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant and vice

versa).
113. See id.; Allen, supra note 2, at 896 ("Thus, in order to expedite trials, the burden of production in some classes of cases may be placed on one party if the means of
proving the issue are normally within his or her knowledge." (citation omitted)); see
also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981)
("Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to

meet the plaintiffs prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action

and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full

and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 516 (1993) (reiterating the statement from Burdine).

114. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct.
1003, 1012-16 (1998).
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (investing federal district
courts with "exclusive jurisdiction" over FTCA actions).
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risdiction. 116 And third, the FTCA waives the117United States' sovereign immunity and must be strictly construed.
The allocation rule prescribed for the FTCA's jurisdictional conditions accounts for each of these policy objectives. Perhaps the most
notable aspect of the proposed rule is that it subscribes to a different
burden-shifting scheme when a party is in a relatively better position
to raise an issue. Rather than shifting the burden of persuasion, the
rule proposed here shifts the burden of production onto the United
States because (1) it is in the best position to raise a jurisdictional
condition as a bar to suit and (2) it will likely possess information
relevant to the condition. There is surely nothing exceptional about
this proposition. Because federal courts must make jurisdictional determinations as soon as practicable, they have a keen interest in fashioning their procedures so that the jurisdictional question is resolved
as expeditiously and fairly as possible. Otherwise, the court and the
parties may be set adrift on a sea of limitless factual and legal possibilities whose resolution may unduly tax judicial resources that are
better used for determining the merits of the underlying claim. Indeed, in the FTCA context, the factual issues surrounding a jurisdictional condition can be daunting, involving questions of governmental
practices dating back many years. 118 Because the United States will
have to take its best shot and produce evidence of a jurisdictional defect, the jurisdictional inquiry contemplated here will not be a procedural black hole, engulfing the court and the parties in an open-ended
process with no definable rules for production and persuasion.
As such, requiring the United States to bear the burden of production on FTCA jurisdictional questions promotes judicial economy. To
move for a dismissal, the United States (like any other litigant) must
have a good faith evidentiary basis for doing so." 9 That means that
the government possesses information suggesting that an FTCA claim
is jurisdictionally defective in fact. It makes perfect sense, then, to
impose a burden of production on the government-to do otherwise
puts the FTCA plaintiff in the anomalous position of shouldering a
burden of persuasion within an evidentiary vacuum. The plaintiff, and
the court, should know precisely why the government believes an
116. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (au-

thorities cited therein).
117. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992); United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,

117-18 (1979); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1969); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-88 (1941).

118. See, e.g., Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273, 1274 (8th Cir. 1993) (involving claims concerning an Atlas missile facility, which was constructed in 1959); In re

Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 984 (9th Cir.
1987) (discussing claims involving nuclear weapons tests from the closing days of
World War II to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963).

119. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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FTCA claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.1 2
Proving subject matter jurisdiction in FTCA actions does not raise
the same type of proof problems that were presented in Summers or
that have compelled commentators to require a shift in the burden of
persuasion. The plaintiff in Summers was unable to prove causation
even after the defendants disclosed evidence critical to the causation
question; the plaintiff was unable to show that either of the defendants
more probably than not caused him damage. 12' By contrast, once the
United States produces evidence that makes out a prima facie case
that an FTCA claim is jurisdictionally barred, the plaintiff will have
access to the evidence supporting the United States' contention. The
plaintiff would thereafter be in just as good a position as the United
States to prove or disprove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
applicability of any jurisdictional condition that the United States may
raise.

Moreover, shifting only the burden of production to the government fits hand-in-glove with burden allocation with respect to subject
matter jurisdiction generally and with the FTCA's jurisdictional conditions in particular. Subject matter jurisdiction surely is not a procedural nicety; it has constitutional dimensions because it concerns a
federal court's very power to adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the
parties to a civil controversy."2 Unlike state courts, federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction." 2 Article III, Section 1 of the Constitu120. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56
(1981) ("Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the
action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will
have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."); Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S.
561, 567 (1915) ("[I]t is the duty of the [party challenging the assertion of jurisdiction]
to bring the matter to the attention of the court, in some proper way, where the facts
are known upon which a want of jurisdiction appears."); Sternberg Dredging Co. v.
Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 196 F.2d 1002, 1006 (2d Cir. 1952) ("It is often a controlling factor in deciding where to throw the burden of producing evidence-and
obviously it ought to be-that the proper party to charge is he who alone could discover the truth." (citation omitted)); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 516 (1993) (reiterating the statement from Burdine).
121. See Summers v. ice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1948); see also supra note 109
(presenting views of some commentators on the burden of proof imposed on a party
in control of critical information).
122. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.1, at 247-28 (2d ed. 1994);
Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 2.2, at 12 (2d ed. 1993); Wright, Federal
Courts, supra note 9, § 1, at 2.
123. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994);
Wright, Federal Courts, supra note 9, § 7, at 22. To be sure, some states adopt the
federal scheme for allocating the burden of proving jurisdiction, imposing it on the
jurisdiction-seeking party. See, e.g., Manufacturers' Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson
Draughon College, 565 P.2d 864, 865-66 (Ariz. 1977) (stating that the party asserting
jurisdiction has the burden establishing it); Inselberg v. Inselberg, 128 Cal. Rptr. 578,
581 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating that the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction); Greenly v.
Davis, 486 A.2d 669, 670 (Del. 1984) (same); Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60, 64 n.2
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tion grants Congress the power to create inferior federal courts, and
with that power comes the authority to expand or restrict the jurisdiction of those courts.' 2 4 Because the plaintiff in FTCA cases is seeking
to open a federal forum for her claim, an Article III court simply cannot adjudicate her claim unless she has made a showing to the court
that jurisdiction is proper. This, in its most basic form, explains why a
plaintiff bears a non-shifting burden of persuasion on the jurisdictional question. a"
At the same time, one can readily see the connection between the
limited-jurisdiction principle and waivers of sovereign immunity. Historically, government entities were immune from suit pursuant to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Captured by Blackstone's oft-quoted
phrase, "the King can do no wrong,"'2 6 the doctrine is grounded in the
normative principle that a sovereign that confers rights on its citizens
cannot be sued by a citizen who enjoys those rights. Justice Holmes
captured it best when he said: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends."' 7 Because, in modern parlance, a citizen cannot bite the hand that feeds
her, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents courts from holding
the United States liable for the tortious conduct of its employees; Article III courts lack jurisdiction over the United States unless Congress
consents to suit.
From a legal process standpoint, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
is intimately connected to federal subject matter jurisdiction; indeed
the sovereign-immunity defense would be a toothless one without a
jurisdictional component. Without a statute abrogating a sovereign's
immunity, suits brought against sovereign entities-like the United
States-are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.128 Withholding federal subject matter jurisdiction is the legal tool for enforcing the normative principle that citizens cannot use rights created by a
(D.C. 1991) (same); Kohn v. La Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin,
476 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (same); State ex rel. Anaya v. Columbia
Research Corp., 583 P.2d 468, 469 (N.M. 1978) (same); State ex rel. Sweere v. Crookham, 609 P.2d 361, 363 (Or. 1980) (same). If it can be said that federal and state

courts impose the burden of proving jurisdiction in the same manner, then the allocation scheme we propose here has even greater support.
124. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
125. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citing authorities); McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).

126. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *239.
127. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (stating that a
sovereign "is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued"); Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382, 388-89 (1939) (finding that when Congress has not conferred
jurisdiction, suits against the United States must be dismissed); Kansas v. United
States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907) (noting that the United States cannot be sued without
its consent).
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sovereign against that same entity. Of course, it has always been recognized that Congress can waive the United States' immunity from
suit. It did so, for example, in 1887 with the passage of the Tucker
Act, which waived the United States' immunity with respect to contract claims. 2 9 When Congress waives the United States' sovereign
immunity, it does so by providing (as it must) a statute that defines the
parameters of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Absent congressional consent, Article III courts violate the separation of powers by
exercising jurisdiction over the United States.1 30 Congress controls
the purse strings and is therefore the only branch of government that
may open the Treasury's coffers for judgments entered against the federal government.1 3 ' Article III courts, therefore, should not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over the United States unless Congress
has specifically and unequivocally given Article III courts the jurisdictional green light.
But Congress often sets limits on the waiver of sovereign immunity,
and those limits prevent Article I courts from exercising jurisdiction
over the United States when Congress has determined that certain
conduct of government officials or particular theories of recovery
should not be adjudicated in an Article III court. Stated another way,
when Congress waives the United States' sovereign immunity and imposes certain conditions on that waiver, a plaintiff who fails to meet
one of the conditions returns Article III courts to the status quo
ante-no jurisdiction over the United States. Accordingly, because an
FTCA plaintiff seeks to alter the status quo, that plaintiff should logically bear the burden of ultimately persuading a federal district court
that it has jurisdiction over an FTCA claim. 32
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall

have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded ... upon any express or implied contract with the United States.").
130. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) ("In the absence of
clear congressional consent. . . 'there is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more
than in any other court to entertain suits against the United States."' (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1969) ("[T]he Court of Claims'

jurisdiction to grant relief depends wholly upon the extent to which the United States
has waived its sovereign immunity to suit and that such a waiver.. . [is] unequivocally
expressed.").

131. See Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 429 (1990)

("The provisions of the [FTCA] ...also provide a strong indication of Congress'

general approach to claims based on governmental misconduct, and suggest that it has
considered and rejected the possibility of an additional exercise of its appropriation

power to fund claims similar to those advanced here.").
132. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834) ("As the
United States are [sic] not suable of common right, the party who institutes such suit
must bring his case within the authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over it."); Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.
1995) (stating essentially the same principle in the FTCA context); Gould v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)

("The terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit."); Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir.
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Not so, the critic would say. Imposing on FTCA plaintiffs the burden of overcoming a no-jurisdiction presumption sufficiently accounts
for the limited-jurisdiction doctrine because it requires plaintiffs to
make some showing that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Once a
plaintiff makes that showing, the plaintiff has satisfied her burden of
proof. This is especially appropriate, so the argument goes, when the
United States moves to dismiss a case and controls information critical
to the jurisdictional condition that is the subject of the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, fairness dictates that the United States, seeking to
extinguish an FICA plaintiff's right to tort recovery, should bear the
ultimate burden of persuading a federal district court that the tort
claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This
argument, however, must fail.
Although some courts have endorsed this rationale for burden allocation in the IFTCA context, 13 3 the argument is inconsistent with basic
rules of federal pleading. It is well-settled in the federal system that
the party who bears the burden of pleading an issue also carries the
twin burdens of persuasion and production. 134 Suggesting that an
FTCA plaintiff, who must merely plead subject matter jurisdiction to
overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption, thereafter bears no burden
of proof whatsoever undermines this principle. Moreover, imposing
1983) ("The party who sues the United States bears the burden of pointing to such an
unequivocal waiver of immunity."); Cole v. United States, 657 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir.
1981) (same); Thompson/Center Arms Co. v. Baker, 686 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D.N.H.
1988) (same). See generally 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 337, at 428
(stating that party seeking to change the status quo is the party who should logically
carry the burden of persuasion).
133. See, e.g., Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the United States bears the ultimate burden of proving the applicability of the
discretionary function exception); Carlyle v. United States Dep't of the Army, 674
F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); Angle v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 1386, 1390
(W.D. Mich. 1994) (same), affd, 89 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1996). We shall have more to
say about the Prescott line of cases later. See infra Part IV.C.1 (arguing that Prescott
wrongly decided the burden-of-proof question).
134. See 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 337, at 427 ("The pleadings
therefore provide the common guide for apportioning the burdens of proof."); id. at
428 ("The burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have been and
should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of
affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of
proof or persuasion.").
To be sure, Professor McCormick cautions that "looking for the burden of pleading
is not a foolproof guide to the allocation of the burdens of proof." Id. As an example,
Professor McCormick points to the problem of contributory negligence, which the
defendant ordinarily must prove. In federal court, however, "where jurisdiction is
based upon diversity of citizenship, the applicable substantive law may place the burdens of producing evidence and persuasion with regard to that issue on the plaintiff."
Id. But because subject matter jurisdiction is a federal question, federal rules of
pleading control. Those pleading rules-Rule 8(a)(1)-plainly and unequivocally
place the burden of pleading the issue on the jurisdiction-seeking party. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Therefore, Professor McCormick's concern with respect to the limited
persuasiveness of the burden-of-pleading rationale for burden allocation is inapplicable in the FTCA context.
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only a burden of pleading compliance with the Act's jurisdictional
conditions does not sufficiently vindicate the principle that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The principle means little if
an FrCA plaintiff can plead her way into federal court and then foist
upon the United States the ultimate burden of proving that she should
not be there. That gets it backward.
For this reason, the justification for imposing the ultimate burden of
proving federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be reduced to an
access-to-information rationale. Our rule recognizes this by shifting
only the burden of production to the party most likely to possess information on jurisdictional issues, the United States. Plaintiffs must
always carry the ultimate burden of persuasion because federal courts
are not presumptively open; indeed, they are, and always have been,
presumptively closed. There is no principled justification for concluding that the affirmative duty to prove an entitlement to a federal forum somehow changes depending on who
controls the evidence
135

relevant to a jurisdictional determination.

One may argue that, as the party seeking a dismissal, the government is the party desiring change and should therefore carry the burden of persuasion. Moreover, because the defense of sovereign
immunity is a relic of the past, the United States should carry the burden of persuasion in all cases in which it raises sovereign immunity as
a basis for a jurisdictional dismissal. Accordingly, the argument would
conclude, the reality of burden allocation is in keeping with Professor
135. Professors Hay and Spier have posed the following hypothetical that may cast
doubt on our suggestion that a shifting burden of production puts the plaintiff in just
as good a position as the United States to prove the applicability or non-applicability
of a jurisdictional condition:
Suppose, for example, that the defendant has exclusive possession of relevant evidence. Giving the plaintiff the burden of proof may lead her to demand, and sift through, piles of information that may or may not contain
useful evidence-generating costs that might be avoided if the defendant
were given the burden of proof. [Footnote omitted.] Determining the parties' relative costs thus requires the court to decide who initially possesses
what evidence and how costly and effective the discovery process is.
Hay & Spier, supra note 2, at 419. This hypothetical problem poses no problem under
the allocation rule that we propose. The government is required to make a prima
facie case that an FTCA claim is jurisdictionally barred, thereby giving plaintiffs a
specific basis from which to conduct discovery to disprove the government's case. If
the plaintiff must "sift through piles of information that may or may not contain useful evidence" (something the government must also do), that is no reason to shift the
entire burden of proof to the government. The plaintiff need only ask the court for
more time. But even if we assume that Professors Hay and Spier's hypothetical conclusion is correct, we fail to see how shifting the entire burden of proof to the United
States will eliminate costs that might otherwise be avoided. It seems to us that the
costs to the plaintiff are the same, regardless of whether she or the government bears
the burden of persuasion. The plaintiff is likely to devote the same amount of time
defeating the government's suggestion that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking as
proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Therefore, the costs to the parties seem rather an unhelpful guide to burden allocation in the FTCA context.
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McCormick's suggestion that the burden of proof should be placed
"on the party desiring change" and that burden allocation can also
turn on "special policy considerations such as those disfavoring certain
defenses."' 36 The argument is not persuasive.
Although the United States, in some sense, is the party "desiring
change" (i.e., a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), the
argument loses the forest for the tree; it overlooks the critical point
that the plaintiff is really the party desiring change-opening an
otherwise closed federal forum to hear a tort claim-and therefore
should carry the ultimate burden of persuasion. In addition, although
the plaintiff may initially overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption by
filing a complaint that is not facially defective, the plaintiff's ultimate
burden of proving the basis for subject matter jurisdiction should not
disappear. Indeed, precisely the opposite is true: Because the allocation rule prescribes a presumption that can be overcome relatively
easily through a well-pleaded complaint-a result compelled by Rule
8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-an FTCA plaintiff
cannot be permitted to remain in federal court on the basis of the
pleadings alone. Such a construction of federal subject matter jurisdiction invites mischief.
Professor McCormick's suggestion that burden allocation should
turn on whether a particular defense is disfavored has no place in the
FrCA jurisdictional scheme. Over the years and in some quarters,
the defense of sovereign immunity has fallen in disrepute and may
have caused courts to factor their distaste for the defense into their
allocation rules. 1 37 Whatever the merits of Professor McCormick's

suggestion with respect to garden-variety issues like contributory negligence, the "disfavored defense" rationale for burden allocation is inappropriate in the context of allocating the burden of proving subject
matter jurisdiction. An Article III court violates the separation of
powers by labeling a congressionally imposed jurisdictional condition
as a "disfavored" defense. A jurisdictional condition can never succumb to judicial disapproval because it is that condition itself that
breathes jurisdictional life into an Article III court. Thus, even if an
FTCA jurisdictional condition is deemed "disfavored," such a characterization cannot play any role in allocating the burden of proving a
congressionally mandated condition on federal subject matter
jurisdiction.

136. 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 4, § 337, at 432.
137. See, e.g., Friedenthal et al., supra note 122, § 2.10, at 53-54 ("Congress has
waived immunity in a number of statutes and in recent years the defense of sovereign
immunity has been viewed with increasing disfavor. Thus, the federal courts now are
somewhat more inclined to find that consent has been granted

omitted)).

....

"

(citation
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Examples from the FTCA

Allocating the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in the
manner proposed here is not without support in the FTCA context.
For instance, in Ochran v. United States,'3 8 the Eleventh Circuit,
although not explicitly deciding the burden-of-proof issue with respect
to the Act's jurisdictional conditions, recognized the distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production. The
Ochran court concluded that when the United States raises the discretionary function exception, the government should at least bear the
burden of production.' 39 Similarly, although not couched in the language of burden of persuasion versus burden of production, the
FrCA's scope-of-employment cases clearly contemplate a burden allocation scheme similar to the one we have prescribed for the FTCA's
other jurisdictional conditions. The Act protects federal employees
from being sued in federal court for actions taken while in the scope
of their federal employment."4 If the Attorney General certifies that
the employee was acting within the scope of her employment, the federal employee is absolutely immune from suit; the United States becomes the proper party defendant. 4 ' If the plaintiff pleads that a
federal employee was acting outside the scope of her employment
(i.e., overcoming the Prong 1 no-jurisdiction presumption), the burden
of producing evidence that the employee was in fact acting within the
scope of her employment shifts to the United States, who plainly is in
the best position to produce evidence on that issue; certification by
the Attorney General is prima facie evidence of a scope-of-employment finding (Prong 2). If the Attorney General certifies the federal
employee, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to ultimately prove
that the employee was not acting within the scope of her employment;
that is, that subject matter jurisdiction is proper (Prong 3). This
method of allocating the burden of proof in scope-of-employment
cases has been endorsed by an overwhelming majority of federal circuit courts. 42
138. 117 F.3d 495 (11th Cir. 1997).
139. See id. at 504 n.4.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (1994).
141. See Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F.3d 1501, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
142. See, e.g., Maron v. United States, 126 F.3d 317,323 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the plaintiff must bear the burden of proof "to refute the certification of scope of
employment issued by the Attorney General and to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendants were not acting within the scope of their employment");
Rogers v. Management Tech., Inc., 123 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that where a
plaintiff asserts that a defendant acted outside the scope of employment despite the
Attorney General's certification to the contrary, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 1148, 1154-55 &
n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996)
(same); Heuton v. Anderson, 75 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); Williams v.
United States, 71 F.3d 502, 505-06 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Billings v. United States, 57
F.3d 797, 799-800 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Kinibro, 30 F.3d at 1504-06 (same); Melo v.
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C. A Brief Word on Quantum
Perhaps the most difficult question concerns the quantum of evidence required to meet the no-jurisdiction presumption and the burdens of persuasion and production we have recommended for FTCA
plaintiffs and the United States. We shall not attempt here to provide
detailed and comprehensive quantum rules; federal district courts are
in the best position to make those decisions on a case-by-case basis.
Indeed, because the FTCA itself does not prescribe a burden allocation scheme, much less the evidentiary requirements for such a
scheme, the quantum of evidence necessary to adjudicate the threepart rule should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. With
that said, though, we offer some general guidelines for putting teeth
into the proposed allocation rule and save for later a discussion of the
quantum of evidence required for some of 1the
most commonly liti43
gated jurisdictional conditions in the FTCA.

Overcoming the no-jurisdiction presumption requires federal district courts to evaluate the complaint as a whole to determine whether
the plaintiff's FrCA complaint is jurisdictionally viable. Courts
should pay particular attention to the exceptions in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h). Section 2680(h) specifically precludes subject matter jurisdiction if the plaintiff alleges assault, battery, false imprisonment, or
other well-known tort theories.14 4 Of course, FTCA plaintiffs, for the
most part, will not use those words to describe their causes of action.
Rather, the plaintiff may allege facts that ostensibly amount to pleading one of the § 2680(h) exceptions. If a court concludes that the allegations in the complaint, in effect, assert a theory proscribed by
§ 2680(h), the court should conclude that the plaintiff has not overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption.
The United States meets its burden of production only if it produces
sufficient competent evidence showing that the plaintiffs FTCA claim
is jurisdictionally defective. The government may produce direct or
circumstantial evidence; a scintilla of evidence, however, will not do.
The decision-making heuristic here is whether, in light of the evidence
presented by the government, a court could find that the condition has
not been met. Federal district courts may wish to view this exercise as
if they were deciding a motion for directed verdict. 145 Put another
Hafer, 13 F.3d 736, 742-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 (9th
Cir. 1993) (same); Arbour v. Jenkins, 1993 WL 342872, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 1993)
(per curiam) (same); Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 935-36 (3d Cir. 1992) (same);
Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Hamrick v.
Franklin, 931 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); S.J. & W. Ranch, Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538, 1540-42 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), amended by 924 F.2d 1555 (11th
Cir. 1991).
143. See infra Part IV (discussing the administrative exhaustion, statute of limitations, discretionary function, and independent contractor conditions).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
145. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52.
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way, if the evidence produced by the government would not entitle it
to a favorable judgment, a federal district court should conclude that
the government has failed to meet its burden, thereby entitling the
plaintiff to a decision in its favor. Courts should not make credibility
determinations when deciding whether the United States has met its
burden of production."
Finally, an FTCA plaintiff meets her burden of persuasion if the
evidence, taken as a whole and viewed in light of controlling legal
principles, more probably than not compels a conclusion that subject
matter jurisdiction is proper. In many instances, determining whether
a plaintiff has satisfied Prong 3 requires the district court to weigh the
plaintiff's facts and the government's facts against the legal principles
that control the jurisdictional determination. Repair to precedent is
usually the most effective means for determining which party has the
better of the argument. If the case is one of first impression, the court
should look to the policies underlying the jurisdictional condition and
determine whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff balanced
against the evidence presented by the government entitles the plaintiff
to proceed with her FTCA suit.
D.

Conclusions

The distinction between a burden of persuasion and a burden of
production paves a viable middle ground for allocating the burden of
proving the FTCA's jurisdictional conditions. Not only were the twin
burdens commonly understood at common law as two sides of the
same burden-of-proof coin, but, more importantly, they harmonize
well with the competing policies at stake when deciding how to allocate the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in FTCA cases.
Distinguishing the burden of persuasion from the burden of production protects the well-settled principle that a jurisdiction-seeking party
bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction and, at the
same time, protects FTCA plaintiffs from the untenable situation of
having to produce evidence on each of the jurisdictional conditions to
gain access to federal court. The principal benefit of imposing the
burden of production on the government is that jurisdictional facts
and legal issues are narrowed down to their critical components, giving all parties and the court a tangible and specific jurisdictional issue
to adjudicate. Likewise, the United States suffers little hardship in
having to produce evidence that an FTCA claim is jurisdictionally
barred. Once the United States makes a sufficient evidentiary showing, the plaintiff must then proceed to satisfy her ultimate burden of
146. See, eg., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (-In the
nature of things, the determination that a [party] has met its burden of production...
can involve no credibility assessment.").
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proving that subject matter jurisdiction over the United States is
proper.
III.

CRITIQUES OF THE ALLOCATION RULE

Of course, criticisms may be leveled against the proposed three-part
allocation rule for the FICA's jurisdictional conditions. The first
comes from Professor Roger Dworkin, who has attacked the burdenof-proof concept as a judicial tool for advancing policy judgments that
should be made by legislatures. Second, Professor John McNaughton
has argued that the distinction between a burden of persuasion and a
burden of production is illusory, thereby suggesting that the proposed
rule draws a distinction where none exists. And third, one might argue that the proposed burden allocation scheme is inconsistent with
other schemes that have been devised for waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes. As we now show, the arguments do not undermine the
viability of the allocation rule we have proposed.
A.

Professor Dworkin's Critique of the Burden-of-ProofConcept

Although the rule proposed here properly accounts for the policy
concerns implicated in fashioning burden-of-proof rules generally and
the FTCA in particular, this Article assumes that formulating rules for
burden allocation in the jurisdictional context is a worthwhile enterprise. Not so, says Professor Roger Dworkin, perhaps one of the most
outspoken critics of the burden-of-proof concept. Professor Dworkin
has given a tongue-lashing to the concept of burdens of proof, arguing
that shifting the burden of proof-especially manipulating the burden
14 7
of persuasion-operates as a mask for substantive legal change.
This occurs, argues Professor Dworkin, because allocation of a burden
of production or burden of persuasion becomes "outcome determinative."' 48 This is undesirable because such manipulation distorts the
process of effecting legal change by cutting fact-finders out of the process of advancing the law or by cloaking courts with policymaking authority that ill-suits them.'4 9 In Dworkin's eyes, these problems are
insurmountable and require the wholesale abandonment of the burden-of-proof concept. 5 '
Professor Dworkin is undoubtedly correct that manipulating the
burden of proof as a smokescreen for substantive legal change "hinders progress and confuses judges, lawyers, and the law.' 51 Such manipulation permits courts to cloak their policy judgments in burden-ofproof language. Dworkin is also correct in his observation that legal
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1174-75.
Id. at 1172.
See id. at 1178-81.
See id.
Id. at 1175.
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change should proceed along legitimate lines and not by judicial legislation through burden-of-proof manipulation. Although penned years
before the burden-of-proof confusion arose in the FTCA context, Professor Dworkin's view explains, perhaps better than any other, the inconsistency that now permeates the law regarding allocating the
burden of proving the FTCA's jurisdictional conditions. Indeed, a
good argument can be made that courts that have manipulated the
burden of proof-either by Rule 12(b)(1) conversion or by holding
that the United States bears the ultimate burden of proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking-have done so precisely because they wish to open the federal courthouse doors a bit wider than
Congress did when it enacted the FTCA.
The rule proposed here, though, rescues current doctrine from the
jurisprudential abyss described by Professor Dworkin, but does so
without abandoning the burden-of-proof concept altogether. The rule
crafted here anchors allocation to the policy judgments made by Congress when it enacted the FTCA and does not cut those policy judgments loose-through burden-of-proof manipulation-from the
deliberative process that gave them birth. The FTCA must be interpreted against the broader landscape of federal-courts and commonlaw doctrines accepted at the time the Act was passed. Because Congress did not provide in the text of the statute or in its legislative history any exception from well-accepted practices of burden allocation
in the jurisdictional context, those allocation rules should be (at the
very least) a preliminary guide for fashioning burden-of-proof rules.
By assigning the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff and imposing
the burden of production on the United States, the proposed rule is in
keeping with the limited-jurisdiction and the waiver-of-sovereign-immunity principles that underlie the FTCA. As such, the proposed rule
does not equip Article III courts with a tool for sidestepping congressional intent; quite the contrary, it binds them to that intent.
To be sure, one may argue that the rule proposed here falls into the
Dworkin trap of manipulating the burden of proof to achieve substantive legal change, namely, that a greater number of meritorious tort
claims against the United States would never get a hearing in federal
court. The critic would argue that this rule narrows the waiver of sovereign immunity even more than Congress intended. This would be so
because the rule imposes on the FTCA plaintiff the burden of persuading a federal district court that jurisdiction over the United States
is proper even though the United States is the party moving for dismissal and may retain exclusive control over information relevant to a
jurisdictional condition (e.g., the discretionary function exception).
The argument, however, fails.
The critical flaw in the argument is that it assumes that Congress
somehow intended to deviate from well-settled principles of burdenof-proof allocation with respect to subject matter jurisdiction. Of
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course, absent an explicit statement in the text or legislative history of
the FTCA, courts must assume that Congress intended to incorporate
into the Act the prevailing method of allocating the burden of proving
subject matter jurisdiction. 52 As this Article notes, the mere fact that
the United States may be in the best position to provide evidence of
the applicability or non-applicability of a jurisdictional condition is no
reason to shift the ultimate burden of persuasion onto the United
States. Rather, a shifting burden of production is an effective tool for
efficiently adjudicating the question of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.' 53 Imposing on the United States the burden of producing evidence that it controls and that sheds light on a jurisdictional
condition cures the inefficiency of imposing that burden on FTCA
plaintiffs. At the same time, the rule preserves the well-established
principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, requiring plaintiffs to prove that they are entitled to a federal forum.
Finally, Professor Dworkin thinks the burden of persuasion and the
burden of production are useless aids to decision-making. He argues
that "the burden of persuasion has no procedural effect and that the
burden of producing evidence performs an unnecessary function with
an inappropriate procedural effect."' 54 As to the burden of persuasion, Professor Dworkin asserts that it only matters "when the fact
finder's mind is in a state of complete equilibrium" and that such a
mind set is rarely, if ever, present in the run of cases. 155 With respect
to the burden of production, Professor Dworkin contends that "[t]he
burden of producing evidence ...

force[s] a party to gamble on the

sufficiency of his evidence and impose[s] the sanction of defeat for a
wrong guess regardless of the probability that his position on the merits is correct. Present law provides no second chances."'156 Again, we
disagree with this analysis insofar as it applies to the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in the FTCA context.
Professor Dworkin is correct that the allocation of the burden of
persuasion should, theoretically, only make a difference when there is
an equilibrium in the evidence. Under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the party with the weightier evidence should prevail
regardless of which party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. As
true as this may be in theory, however, as a practical matter it is not
true, especially in the FTCA context. Indeed, cases have turned on
which party carries the ultimate burden of proof.'57 In addition, the
152. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1992); Logue v. United
States, 412 U.S. 521, 526-28 (1973); Reo v. United States Postal Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 77
(3d Cir. 1996).
153. See supra Part II.B.2.
154. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1179.
155. Id. at 1164; see also id. at 1165-67 (discussing other situations when the burden

of persuasion matters).
156. Id. at 1159.
157. In Prescott v. United States, the court stated:
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burden of persuasion is useful if only because it orients the parties'
fact gathering and the court's fact-finding. Otherwise, a party risks
losing a motion for directed verdict, where the court must decide
whether the non-moving party has "failed to carry an essential burden
of proof."1s8
We likewise cannot agree with Professor Dworkin's analysis of the
burden of production. The proposed rule does not require the United
States to "gamble" and suffer a defeat because it has made a "wrong
guess" about the probity of the evidence produced. Because the burden of production is allocated according to who is in the best position
to focus the issues and produce evidence on the jurisdictional condition, the government will not be offering a court or the opposing party
a "guess" as to what is the best evidence for its position. To the contrary, the United States will know quite well how relevant the information produced is to the jurisdictional condition in issue. On the
other hand, if the government is guessing, then the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
provide a remedy for that as well, albeit a bitter
9
one.

15

B.

Professor McNaughton: The Illusory Distinction Benveen a
Burden of Persuasionand a Burden of Production

Professor John McNaughton argued in an influential paper published in 1955 that distinguishing between a burden of persuasion and
a burden of production is an attempt to draw a distinction between
two concepts that are identical in their operation."
In particular,
Professor McNaughton asserted that the burden to produce evidence
is no different from the burden to persuade because the "'duty of
bringing forward evidence' ... is a derivative function of the burden
of persuasion."'' This is so, according to Professor McNaughton, because "[p]ersuasion-or belief, or probability-is the basic ingredient
Th[e] question turns on the allocation of the burden of proving (or disproving) the applicability of the discretionary function exception. If the plaintiffs

bear the burden of disproving the applicability of the discretionary function
exception, then the government would be entitled to summary judgment if
plaintiffs fail to come forth with sufficient evidence to establish that there
are genuine issues of material fact on the discretionary function issue. However, if the government bears the burden of proving the applicability of the
exception, then the government would be entitled to summary judgment if it
has adduced sufficient evidence to establish that no genuine issues of material fact remain for trial with respect to the discretionary function exception.
973 F.2d 696, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1992). See also, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d
639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court's allocation of the burden of
proof was dispositive).

158. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee's note.
159. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring signed pleading attesting to the accuracy and
soundness of the arguments presented).
160. See McNaughton, supra note 2.
161. Id at 1382.
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of both burden of production and burden of persuasion.' 16 Accordingly, we suspect that Professor McNaughton would conclude that the
allocation rule proposed here proves his point because Prong 2 of the
rule requires the government to make a prima facie case for lack of
jurisdiction. "Making a prima facie case" plainly contemplates persuasion, so that Prong 2 is doctrinally deficient in the manner described by Professor McNaughton.
We agree with Professor McNaughton's prescient observation, but
only so far as it goes. 163 Allocation rules are designed for more than
mere academic banter. The primary reason to distinguish the burden
of persuasion from the burden of production is to promote the more
efficient adjudication of disputes. Burden allocation defines the procedural rules of the game, so that courts, plaintiffs, and defendants will
know who must present what, how much, and when. In addition, allocation rules also help frame the discovery process, guiding parties in
their accumulation of evidence. This is especially true in the jurisdictional context, where courts and litigants become involved in a Rule
12(b)(1) fact-finding process, in which judges are permitted to resolve
evidentiary confficts early in a case. The proposed allocation rule goes
a long way towards focusing factual and legal issues down to their
essential components, so that courts and litigants need not endure a
needlessly protracted process of determining subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, burden-shifting schemes of the sort we propose for
FTCA cases are strewn throughout the law,l 64 suggesting that, despite
any doctrinal defects in distinguishing between burdens of persuasion
and production, there is at least some practical value to them.
C. Other Waiver-of-Sovereign-Immunity Statutes: The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"), 1 assigning to the judiciary the decision of whether a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity. Like the FTCA, the
FSIA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, investing district
courts with subject matter jurisdiction only if one of several statutory
162. Id. at 1390-91.
163. There is one point made by Professor McNaughton that does not necessarily
apply in the context of allocating the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction.

One of the reasons behind Professor McNaughton's suggestion that the distinction
between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production is illusory is that
parties come to civil litigation at an evidentiary equilibrium. See McNaughton, supra
note 2, at 1385, 1390. This is not a technically accurate description of the relative
position of the parties with respect to subject matter jurisdiction: The jurisdiction-

seeking party comes to federal court with a no-jurisdiction presumption against her.
Of course, under the allocation rule we have proposed, once that presumption is overcome, it disappears. It is only at that point that one says that the United States and
FTCA plaintiffs are at some sort of "equilibrium."
164. See supra note 1.
165. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
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exceptions applies. 6 6 A number of courts have concluded that the

party seeking the protection of sovereign immunity (a foreign state)
has the ultimate burden of proving that federal district courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over the FSIA claim.1 67 The allocation of
the burden of proof, however, was not judge-made. Rather, courts
have simply relied on an explicit statement from a House Report accompanying the FSIA, which states:
[S]ince sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be
specially pleaded, the burden will remain on the foreign state to
produce evidence in support of its claim of immunity. Thus, [1] evidence must be produced to establish that a foreign state or one of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities is the defendant in the
suit and that the plaintiff's claim relates to a public act of the foreign
state-that is, an act not within the exceptions in sections 1605-1607.
[2] Once the foreign state has produced such prima facie evidence
of immunity, the burden of going forward would shift to the plaintiff
to produce evidence establishing that the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. [3] The ultimate
16 burden of proving immunity
would rest with the foreign state. 8
One may argue that the burden-allocation scheme we advocate is
inconsistent with the burden allocation scheme applicable to the
FSIA, a statute, like the FTCA that provides for a waiver of sovereign
immunity. In FSIA cases, and unlike the burden-allocation rule we
have proposed for the FTCA, the plaintiff, seeking to establish that a
federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim involving a foreign sovereign, does not bear the ultimate burden of
proving federal subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the foreign sovereign bears the burden of persuading the court that it lacks jurisdiction.16 9 The FSIA, the argument goes, should be persuasive evidence
166. See id §§ 1605-1607; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
486-88 (1983).
167. See, e.g., Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887,896
(5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the foreign entity who was seeking immunity "bore the
ultimate burden of persuasion"); Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528,

533 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that although the defendant "retains the ultimate burden
of proof of immunity," foreign agencies are accorded a presumption of independent

status); Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del
Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C.,

923 F.2d 380, 390 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he party seeking immunity [under the

FSIA] bears the ultimate burden of proving the nonapplicability of the exceptions
raised by its opponent."); Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285,289
n.6 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that the party claiming immunity retains the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517,522-23
(9th Cir. 1987) (same); Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767
F.2d 998,1002 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621
F.2d 1371, 1378 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
168. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6604,
6616.
169. See id, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6616.
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of a congressional intent to impose the burden of proving sovereign
immunity on the entity seeking immunity.
The FSIA, however, is not a persuasive analog for cases arising
under the FTCA. There is, to be sure, some superficial appeal to the
contention that the FSIA scheme should be imported into the FTCA
context. The FSIA was patterned, at least to some extent, after the
FITCA 17

°

and both statutes were born in response to the doctrine of

sovereign immunity. Yet, we have resisted configuring a burden of
proof rule that would be applicable to all waiver-of-immunity statutes
because, first, such grand attempts to articulate broad-based allocation rules have failed 7 ' and, second, waiver statutes often contain
unique qualities that may give rise to differing rules for burden allocation. The FSIA is a perfect example of the latter concern. One would
scarcely assume that in passing such sweeping legislation, Congress
would prescribe an inflexible burden-allocation rule, not in the text of
the statute, but in a House Report accompanying the legislation. Because this scheme was articulated thirty years after the FTCA was
passed, courts should not look to the FSIA for a resolution of the
allocation problems presented by the FTCA.
Unlike the FSIA, Congress has not explicitly prescribed a method
of burden allocation in the text of or in the legislative history accompanying the FTCA. That Congress chose to prescribe a specific allocation scheme for FSIA cases is critical to an understanding of why
burden allocation should be different in the FTCA context. Because
Congress retains the exclusive constitutional authority to define the
parameters of federal subject matter jurisdiction, it necessarily retains
the power to prescribe the burden of proof applicable to establishing
that jurisdiction. The 1976 Congress obviously intended FSIA cases
to deviate from the limited-jurisdiction principle. It is a giant leap
indeed, however, to conclude that that same intent can be ascribed to
the 1946 Congress. Absent an explicit congressional directive to diverge from the traditional rule that the jurisdiction-seeking party
bears the ultimate burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, wellsettled principles of statutory construction require courts to apply an
allocation rule consistent with the statute under review and consistent
with well-understood common-law principles in effect at the time the
statute was enacted. This method of statutory construction is precisely
what underlies the burden of proof rule proposed here for FTCA
cases.
170. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1980)
("'[T]he granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the courts of the
United States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United
States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract and tort"' (quoting the "Tate Letter," the contents of which later became the foundation for the
FSIA) (emphasis added)).
171. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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APPLYING THE ALLOCATION RULE TO SELECTED
JURISDICTIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE FTCA

This part analyzes how the proposed allocation rule we have proposed guides FTCA jurisdictional determinations. The FTCA contains a number of conditions that must be met before a plaintiff may
proceed against the United States in federal district court. The FTCA
plaintiff must comply with two separate limitations periods, one of
two years and one of six months;17 2 must comply with a mandatory
administrative settlement process; 17 3 and cannot proceed on a variety
of legal theories specifically
proscribed by the language of the FTCA
74
or by court decisions.'
To be sure, these aspects of the FTCA have acquired different labels, and these labels have taken on a jurisprudential life of their own,
often steering the burden-of-proof inquiry toward anomalous conclusions. For instance, courts have described the statute of limitations as
a "condition," administrative exhaustion as a "requirement," and
§ 2680 as providing "exceptions" to the waiver of sovereign immunity.17 5 Some courts have labeled the FTCA statute of limitations and
the § 2680 exceptions as "affirmative defenses," so that one would expect the government to bear the burden of proving them. 76 This
practice of manipulating burden-of-proof allocation by attaching certain labels to these jurisdictional conditions is unprincipled and unjustified. Whether a term of the FTCA is a condition, requirement,
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
173. See id. § 2675(a).

174. Some of the jurisdictional conditions are specifically listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2680,
such as the discretionary function and misrepresentation exceptions. See id. § 2680(a)
(discretionary function); itL § 2680(h) (misrepresentation). Other jurisdictional con-

ditions are found in various parts of the FTCA, such as the independent contractor
exception and the exception for claims with no analogous private liability. See id.
§ 1346(b) (analogous private liability); id. § 2674 (analogous private liability). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the government is not liable under the FTCA
for injuries to service men and women that are "incident to [military] service," even
though there is no statutory exception so stating. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 146 (1950).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (holding that Act's
statute of limitations is a condition of the waiver of immunity); Vujick v. Dale &
Dale, Inc., 43 F.3d 790, 793 (3d Cir. 1994) (referring to FTCA administrative-exhaustion as a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction); Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d
437,440 (10th Cir. 1981) (describing the conditions in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 as exceptions).
176. See, e.g., Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the United States bears the ultimate burden of proving the applicability of the
exception); Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (describing the
Act's six-month limitations period as an affirmative defense and imposing the ultimate burden of proof on the government); Carlyle v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the United States bears the
ultimate burden of proving the applicability of the exception); Angle v. United States,
931 F. Supp. 1386, 1390 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (same), affd, 89 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1996);
Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476, 486 (D. Utah 1981) (describing the discretionary function exception as an affirmative defense).
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exception, or affirmative defense depends not on some principled reason for so labeling the term, but instead on how the court wishes to
construct the evidentiary framework. Indeed, one can certainly toy
with the provisions of the FTCA and construct a number of creative
interpretations of the statute. So, for example, the statute of limitations could just as easily be characterized as an "exception" to the
FCA because it "excepts" claims that are filed outside of the prescribed limitations periods. So, too, with claims that have not been
presented to a federal agency for possible settlement; they are "excepted" from the liability scheme of the FTCA. Regardless of the label, these provisions of the FTCA each set limits on the scope of the
FICA's waiver of sovereign immunity, and those limits define and
circumscribe federal subject matter jurisdiction. Pigeonholing these
limits into legally loaded linguistic categories obscures, if not emasculates, the jurisdiction-limiting function of these provisions of the
statute.
It is important now to examine more closely the fit between the rule
and certain jurisdictional conditions within the Act. There are a
number of jurisdictional conditions in the FTCA, of course, but we
focus on the administrative exhaustion requirement, the statute-oflimitations condition, the discretionary function exception, and the independent contractor exception. Our reasons for doing so are quite
simple: These conditions are the most frequently litigated jurisdictional conditions of the FCA. As this part demonstrates, our allocation rule is faithful to the policies underlying burdens of proof and is
consistent with the text and legislative intent of the FCA.
A. Administrative Exhaustion
In 1966, Congress amended the FCA to conform to the practice
among many states of imposing on tort plaintiffs suing a sovereign
entity a mandatory, administrative-settlement process.' 7 7 Before filing suit in federal district court, FTCA plaintiffs must first present
their tort claims to the appropriate federal agency for possible settlement. 178 Failure to do so deprives a federal district court of jurisdic177. See H.R. Rep. No. 89-1532, at 7 (1966); S. Rep. No. 89-1327, at 3-4 (1966).
178. Section 2675(a) provides:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for
money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in
writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to

make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at
the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of
the claim for purposes of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994).
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tion to adjudicate the FTCA suit. 7 9 In addition, the FTCA imposes
on claimants a mandatory, six-month "no suit" period, in which the
relevant agency is invested with primary jurisdiction over the FTCA
claim.'"" If a claimant files suit before the six-month period expires, a
federal district court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the claim.1 8 '
An FTCA claimant has exhausted her administrative remedies either
when she receives a formal denial of the claim or when six months
pass without the agency having granted or denied the claim. In the
latter case, absent a formal written denial from the agency, the claimant may deem the claim denied by filing suit or by providing the
agency notice (short of filing suit) that she is exercising the deeming
option. 1' 2 The purposes of the FTCA's administrative-exhaustion
scheme are to reduce court congestion, avoid unnecessary litigation,
and provide a dispute resolution scheme fair to plaintiffs, federal
agencies, and the United States.'8
Who should bear the burden of proving that administrative remedies have been exhausted? With one exception federal circuit courts
have not decided the question.' 84 Three issues present themselves.
The first is whether the FTCA claimant presented an administrative
claim to the appropriate federal agency. Assuming a claim has been
presented to the appropriate federal agency, the second issue is
whether the substance of the claim comports with the Act's minimalnotice requirements. And the third issue is whether the FTCA claimant received a formal denial of the claim or deemed the claim denied
more than six months after the claim was properly presented to the
appropriate federal agency. A jurisdictional dismissal may be premised upon any one or more of these exhaustion requirements. Accordingly, this section separately discusses how the burden of proof
should be allocated for each of these requirements.

179. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-13 (1993).
180. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
181. See, e.g., Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing
the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to meet jurisdictional requirements of 2675(a)); Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1974)

(same).
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
183. See H.R. Rep. 89-1532, at 3, 6-8, 10 (1966); S.Rep. No. 89-1327, at 3, 5-6, 11
(1966).
184. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 210, 214 (2d
Cir. 1987) (interpreting the administrative-claim requirement and holding that "[the
burden is on the plaintiff to both plead and prove compliance with statutory requirements"). A handful of district courts have followed In re "Agent Orange." See Marchese v. United States, 781 F. Supp. 241,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. United States, No. 97-3406, 1998 WL 637379, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 1998);
Blackman v. Department of the Navy Military Sealift Command, No. 94-3797, 1995
WL 468253, at *1 (E.D. La. July 27, 1995).
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1. Agency Receipt of the Claim
Courts have held that an FTCA administrative claim has been
"presented" to a federal agency when the agency "receives" the
claim.185 If a plaintiff does not plead that she has fied an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency, that plaintiff cannot
overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption of Prong 1.186 If the plaintiff does plead administrative exhaustion, the United States would

bear the Prong 2 burden of production and provide the court with
competent evidence that an administrative claim was not received by
the appropriate agency. The federal government may meet its burden
of production, for example, by securing affidavits from relevant personnel within the agency to which the plaintiff allegedly sent her
claim. If the United States presents affidavits or other competent evidence suggesting that an administrative claim was not received, then
the plaintiff would carry the ultimate burden of proving that a claim
had in fact been presented to the appropriate federal agency (Prong
3).
This method of allocating the burden of proof is fair. With respect
to the facially defective complaint, the rule proposed here produces
the same results achieved in the diversity jurisdiction context, where a
plaintiff who fails to allege the proper jurisdictional amount runs the
185. See Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1985); Bailey v. United
States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1981); Bellecourt v. United States, 784 F. Supp. 623,
627 & n.3 (D. Minn. 1992); Crack v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 1244, 1246-47 (E.D.
Va. 1988); Murray v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 444, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Barlow v.
Avco Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269, 273 (E.D. Va. 1981); Kirby v. United States, 479 F.
Supp. 863, 867 (D.S.C. 1979); Steele v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (S.D.
Cal. 1975). Courts that have addressed the question have looked to the applicable
regulations and rubber stamped the language in the regulations that defines
"presented" as agency receipt of the claim. See, e.g., Drazan,762 F.2d at 58 (citing 28
C.F.R. § 14.2 and 38 C.F.R. § 14.604(b) and stating that "mailing is not presenting;
there must be receipt"); Bailey, 642 F.2d at 346 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 14.2) (stating that a
claim is presented when it has been received by the federal agency).
186. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange",818 F.2d at 214 (holding that an FTCA plaintiff
must plead compliance with the administrative claim requirement); Erxleben v.
United States, 668 F.2d 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that an FrCA plaintiff must
plead that it submitted a claim to the appropriate federal agency), abrogatedon other
grounds, Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1997); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Bruce v. United States, 621 F.2d 914,
918 (8th Cir. 1980) (same); Altman v. Connally, 456 F.2d 1114, 1116 (2d Cir. 1972)
(same); Clayton v. Pazcoquin, 529 F. Supp. 245, 248-49 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (same);
Knouff v. United States, 74 F.R.D. 555, 557 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (same); 2 Lester S. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims: Administrative & Judicial Remedies § 301.02[2],
at 16-9 (1992). There is nothing mysterious or sinister about why courts impose such a
pleading requirement on FTCA plaintiffs: The plaintiff will know very well whether
she has filed a claim with a federal agency. With respect to other jurisdictional conditions, the complaint may survive a facial attack if it does not mention the jurisdictional condition, provided, of course, the face of the complaint does not reveal that
the condition precludes federal subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law. See infra
Part IV.B-D (discussing the statute of limitations, the discretionary function exception, and the independent contractor exception, respectively).
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risk of dismissal if the defendant challenges jurisdiction and the plaintiff fails to produce evidence that her damages exceed the statutory
amount." 7 Assuming the plaintiff cures the facial defect, imposing
the burden of production on the United States is a straightforward
recognition of the fact that the United States is in the relatively best
position to show that a claim was not received. And imposing the
ultimate burden of persuasion on the F"CA plaintiff brings us back to
the recognition that the burden of persuading a federal court that it
has subject matter jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff, and that burden
never shifts.
Now consider a more complex example. Suppose an FTCA plaintiff
submits an administrative claim to the wrong federal agency.
Although the text of the Act does not specifically address this issue,
Department of Justice regulations require federal agencies that receive claims that do not belong to them to "transfer [the claim] forthwith to the appropriate agency, if the proper agency can be identified
from the claim, and advise the claimant of the transfer."" The regulations further provide that "[i]f transfer is not feasible the claim shall
be returned to the claimant."'1 8 9 Given these regulations-and judicial
insistence that the government strictly adhere to them'9-the government must produce evidence that (1) the appropriate agency did not
receive the claim, (2) transfer of the claim was not feasible, and (3) the
claim was returned to the claimant. If the claim was not received by
the "appropriate agency," but the government fails to offer competent
evidence that transfer of the claim was infeasible or that the claim was
returned to the plaintiff, the government will not have met its Prong 2
burden of production.' 9 ' To meet her burden of persuasion, the plaintiff will have to prove that, even though her claim was sent to the
187. See, e.g., McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936) ("If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any
appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof.").
188. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) (1998).
189. Id
190. See, e.g., Hart v. Department of Labor ex reL United States, 116 F.3d 1338,
1341 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[We hold that if the agency fails promptly to comply with the

transfer regulation and, as a result, a timely filed, but misdirected claim does not
reach the proper agency within the limitations period, the claim may be considered
timely filed."); Greene v. United States, 872 F.2d 236, 237 (8th Cir. 1989) (same);
Bukala v. United States, 854 F.2d 201, 203 (7th Cir. 1988) (same).
191. See, eg., Greene, 872 F.2d at 237 (holding that failure to transfer or return a
claim rendered the claim constructively, and timely, filed with the appropriate
agency). CompareBukala, 854 F.2d at 204 (rejecting the government's argument that
a claim was time-barred where the "wrong" agency made no attempt to transfer the
claim and did not return the claim to the claimant), svith Hart, 116 F.3d at 1341 ("If...
a claimant waits until the eleventh hour to file and, despite notification of the appropriate agency, the filing is misdirected, there is no compelling reason for allowing
constructive filing."), and Lotrionte v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 41, 43 (S.D.N.Y.)
(same), affd, 742 F.2d 1436 (2d Cir. 1983).
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wrong agency, she eventually provided the appropriate agency with
her administrative claim.
2. Minimal Notice Requirements
The fact that a plaintiff presents an administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency does not mean that the plaintiff, ipso facto,
has complied with the FTCA's administrative-exhaustion requirement. The claim must contain information sufficient to place the
agency on notice that the plaintiff is presenting a tort claim for possible settlement. In particular, the plaintiff must describe, at least generally, the facts surrounding the alleged injury to person or property
and supply the agency with a so-called "sum certain" claim for damages.' 92 The minimal notice requirements are critical to the administrative-settlement scheme of the FTCA because they provide agencies
1 93
a foundation upon which to investigate and possibly settle a claim.
Failure to comply with these conditions deprives a federal district
court of jurisdiction over the FTCA suit. 194
If the government concludes that the minimal-requirements aspect
of administrative exhaustion renders a plaintiffs FTCA claim jurisdictionally defective, the burden of production would lie with the United
States. By pleading that she has fied an administrative claim with the
appropriate federal agency, the plaintiff will have overcome the no192. See, e.g., Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding
that before initiating suit, a claimant must file, with the agency, a written statement
sufficiently describing the injury and a sum-certain damages claim); Orlando Helicopter Airways v. United States, 75 F.3d 622, 625-26 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that providing the government with insufficient information to indicate the nature of a claim
is inadequate notice and fails the FTCA's jurisidictional requirement); Manko v.
United States, 830 F.2d 831, 840 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that the plaintiff's administrative claim failed to provide adequate notice because neither all facts nor a specific
amount of money were stated); Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 842 (2d
Cir. 1983) (noting that a plaintiffs "laundry list of potential variables" to render the
government liable is not adequate notice); Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289
(5th Cir.) (requiring a claimant to "give[ ] the agency written notice of his or her claim
sufficient to enable the agency to investigate and place value on their claim"), clarified, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Caidin v. United States, 564 F.2d 284,
287 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he sum certain requirement demands more than mere general
notice to the government of the approximate amount of a claim.").
193. See, e.g., Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that
the purpose of the sum certain requirement is to allow the government to investigate
and determine the feasibility of settlement); Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845,
848-49 (2d Cir. 1986) (positing that minimal notice requirements allow the government to investigate, evaluate, and consider settlement of a claim); Tidd v. United
States, 786 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Molinar v. United States, 515 F.2d
246, 249 (5th Cir. 1975) (same).
194. See, e.g., McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-13 (1993) (affirming the
dismissal of the petitioner's suit because the plaintiff failed to institute the action
within the proper statutory requirement); Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46, 54 (5th
Cir. 1995) (remanding for entry of an order of dismissal because district court lacked
jurisdiction due to plaintiff's non-compliance with minimal notice requirements),
amended on reh'g, 81 F.3d 520 (5th. Cir. 1996)).
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jurisdiction presumption of Prong 1. At that point, the government
must come forward with evidence suggesting that, even though a claim
has been filed, the subsequent suit is jurisdictionally defective because
the plaintiff failed to provide the agency notice of a "sum certain"
damage amount or the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the
claim. The reason the United States bears the burden of production
should be obvious-the government is arguing lack of notice on the
basis of information it possesses and therefore is in the best position
to raise the issue and provide the court with the evidentiary basis for
that assertion. For example, the United States can produce the administrative claim that was received by the agency and argue from
that document that key ingredients (like a sum certain) were missing.
If the government makes a prima facie case, the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that the agency received minimal notice of the tort claim. Whether the United States meets its
burden of production or whether the plaintiff satisfies her burden of
persuasion will largely turn on precedent
governing what is and what
1 95
is not sufficient notice of a tort claim.
3.

The Final Denial

The third and final requirement for administrative-exhaustion is
that the claim must be finally denied at the administrative level. The
FTCA provides that administrative remedies have been exhausted
only when a claim is "finally denied" by the relevant federal agency.' 96
A final denial is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and in the legislative
97
history of the FTCA as occurring under one of two circumstances.
First, it occurs when the claim is formally denied in writing by the
agency. Second, it occurs when, after six months have passed since
the agency received the claim, the claimant takes some action to deem
the claim denied. How does the allocation rule operate when a plaintiff submits an administrative claim to the appropriate agency, but files
suit in federal court before the expiration of six months? In such a
situation, to overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption of Prong 1, the
plaintiff must plead that the agency has formally denied her administrative claim in writing. Otherwise, the suit must be dismissed as
premature.
195. See, e.g., OrlandoHelicopterAirways, 75 F.3d at 625 (holding that word "tort"
need not appear in notice of claim); Bradley v. United States, 951 F.2d 268,271 (10th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a request for damages "in excess of S100,000" was not sufficient notice); 7idd, 786 F.2d at 1567-68 n.6 (holding that attaching medical bills and
repair estimates to a claim may be sufficient notice); Burkins v. United States, 865 F.
Supp. 1480, 1491 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that failure to specify a sum certain in the
original claim and vagueness as to the sum in the amended claim resulted in insufficient notice).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994).
197. See id.; H.R. Rep. 89-1532, at 8 (1966); S. Rep. No. 89-1327, at 5 (1966).
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Assume now that the plaintiff's complaint states that her claim was
finally denied in writing by the agency. Here, the plaintiff will have
overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption, and the burden of producing evidence to contradict the plaintiff's allegation would rest with the
United States. Because the agency to which the claim was allegedly
submitted is an arm of the federal government, the United States
would be in the best position to raise the issue and produce evidence
suggesting that the claim was never finally denied in writing by certified or registered mail. The claim may still be pending; the claim may
not have been denied in writing, but denied orally; or the denial may
not have been sent by certified or registered mail. Regardless of the
reason, the federal government is best positioned to produce evidence
on the subject; it must therefore bear the Prong 2 burden of production. If the United States satisfies Prong 2, the plaintiff would thereafter bear the burden of persuading the federal district court that the
denial was indeed "final," perhaps
by providing the court additional
1 98
evidence on the finality issue.
With respect to final denials that occur via the "deeming option" of
the FTCA, the government would shoulder the burden of production
even though the plaintiff is in the best position to know whether she
has exercised the option. The statute states in part: "The failure of an
agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is
filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter,be deemed
a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section."' 199 The language of the deeming option in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) makes it obvious
that the FTCA plaintiff is in the best position to prove that she has
exercised the option. Nevertheless, the allocation rule proposed here
imposes the burden of production on the government because it is
raising the issue by arguing that the deeming option does not invest
the court with subject matter jurisdiction. In practice, the government
will most likely argue that the plaintiff exercised the option prematurely, that is, by filing suit less than six months from the date on
which the administrative claim was received by the appropriate fed-

198. See, e.g., Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1996) ("We conclude that, where the agency knows the claimant is represented, the regulation directs
the agency to mail the notice of denial to the attorney or legal representative, because

that is the person who is usually responsible for preparing and filing the court ac-

tion."); Raddatz v. United States, 750 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that there

was no valid final denial from the government because the denial letter was not sent

by certified or registered mail and was not mailed by the agency to which the claim
was presented); Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding

that an agency's compliance with final-denial regulations provides claimants "with a
clear landmark that [their] claim[s have] been denied and that [Section 2401(b)'s] six

month clock has begun to run.").

199. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added).

1999]

JURISDICTION AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

2915

eral agency. 2°° Outside the administrative-exhaustion context, the
United States may raise the deeming option by arguing that the plaintiff's claim is time-barred because she failed to file suit six months
after the claim was deemed denied2 1 This brings us to the next topic,
the Act's statute of limitations.
B.

The Statute of Limitations

1. A Jurisdictional Condition or an Affirmative Defense? The
Curse of Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs
The FTCA's statute of limitations imposes two filing deadlines on
claimants. The first requires plaintiffs to file an administrative claim
with the appropriate federal agency within two years after the claim
accrues.' The second time period prescribed in the FTCA applies to
the time within which a claimant must file suit in federal district court.
Once a claim has been finally denied by an administrative agency, a
claimant has six months to file suit. 3 With respect to formal, written
denials issued by the agency, the statute-of-limitations clock begins to
run "after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice
of final denial ...

."I

Failure to comply with either the two-year or

six-month limitations period bars the claimant's suit "forever.""0 5 As
one court has noted, the FTCA's statute of limitations "represents a
deliberate balance struck by Congress whereby a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity is conditioned upon the prompt presentation of
tort claims against the government."' m
200. See id. (stating that a claimant may only exercise the deeming option six
months from the date on which a claim is presented to the appropriate federal
agency).
201. See infra note 204 (discussing the limitations period applicable to the deeming
option).
202. Section 2401(b) provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after
such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date
of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the
claim by the agency to which it was presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
203. See id
204. Id Although the text of § 2401(b) is silent with respect to the limitations period applicable to deemed denials, one author has argued elsewhere that courts
should borrow the six-month period prescribed in § 2401(b) and apply that time period to deemed denials. See Colella, supra note 20, at 427.48. Obviously, if no statute
of limitations applies to deemed denials, the burden-of-proof issue never arises. Because the statute of limitations applicable to the deeming option remains an open
question, we shall assume for purposes of this Article that formal deniers and deemed
denials are subject to the six-month limitations period set forth in § 2401(b).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
206. Gould v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742
(4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); accord United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18
(1979); Hart v. Department of Labor ex reL United States, 116 F.3d 1338, 1341 (10th
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How courts allocate the burden of proof with respect to the FTCA's

statute of limitations appears to turn on how they characterize an
FTCA statute-of-limitations challenge. In particular, courts are split
on the question of whether the FTCA's statute of limitations is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit or an affirmative defense.20 7 If the
FTCA's statute of limitations is a jurisdictional condition to bringing
suit in an Article III court, then the three-part allocation rule proposed here would apply and the FTCA plaintiff would carry the bur-

den of persuasion. 0

On the other hand, if the FITCA's statute of

limitations is deemed a traditional affirmative defense, 0 9 the pro-

posed rule would be inapplicable and the burden of persuasion would
lie with the United States. Disentangling this issue first requires a
consideration of a decision by the Supreme Court that, ironically, did
not specifically address the FTCA, burdens of proof, or whether a limitations period prescribed in a waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute is
jurisdictional.

In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 1 ° the Supreme Court
decided whether the thirty-day limitations period in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act can be equitably tolled.2 1 ' The Court recognized that
the statute of limitations in Title VII was a condition of the waiver of
sovereign immunity and that, when interpreting the scope of the
waiver, courts cannot read into the statute conditions that are not unequivocally expressed. 2 Despite the absence of any equitable tolling
language in Title VII, the Court held that application of equitable tolling to Title VII suits was a permissible construction of the statute be-

cause private parties are subject to equitable tolling
and because
213
doing so would not undermine congressional intent.

Cir. 1997) (citing Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275 (10th Cir.
1991)).
207. For cases holding that the FTCA's statute of limitations is jurisdictional, see
Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1998); Coska v. United States, 114
F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir.
1995); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779 (1st Cir. 1992); Bradley v. United
States, 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1991); Gould v. United States Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). For cases holding that the
Act's limitations periods are not jurisdictional, see Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d
913, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1999); Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir.
1997); Glarner v. United States Dep't of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir.
1994); Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991). For an argument
that two recent Supreme Court decisions compel the conclusion that the FTCA's limitations periods are jurisdictional, see Parker & Colella, supra note 20, at 902-04.
208. See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to the FTCA's statute of
limitations); De Witt v. United States, 593 F.2d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1979) (same).
209. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (listing the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense).
210. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
211. See id. at 93-94.
212. See id. at 94-95.
213. See id. at 95-96.
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Courts have held that Irwin stands for the proposition that the
FTCA's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, but rather an affirmative defense, thereby imposing on the United States the burden
of proof on statute-of-limitations matters.21 4 But even if the FTCA's
limitations periods may be equitably tolled, 2 15 Irwin simply cannot be
read as authority for the proposition that the Act's limitations periods
are affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional prerequisites to suit.
Although a more detailed analysis of this point is provided elsewhere,2 16 we briefly recount that argument here. Courts holding that
the FTCA's statute of limitations is no longer jurisdictional have ostensibly said that the limitations periods are not conditions of the
Act's waiver of sovereign immunity. Of course, this reading of the
FTCA is incorrect. In United States v. Kubrick,21 7 the Supreme Court
squarely held that the FTCA's limitations periods are conditions attached to the waiver of sovereign immunity.2 18 Because the Act's statute of limitations is a condition precedent to bringing suit in federal
district court, waiver-of-sovereign-immunity principles compel the
conclusion that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional.2 19 Accordingly, the FTCA's limitations periods are jurisdictional conditions, not
affirmative defenses, thereby triggering the allocation rule proposed
here.
2.

Allocation for the Two-Year Limitations Provision

Whether an FTCA claim is jurisdictionally barred for failing to
meet the two-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) depends
upon whether the claim "accrued" more than two years before the
claim was filed with the relevant federal agency. Although the FTCA
does not define "accrual," the Supreme Court has held that the twoyear clock begins running when an FTCA plaintiff knew, or, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known, of her injury and
its cause.' The purpose of the Act's two-year limitations period is to
ensure the prompt presentation of tort claims against the United
States. 22 1
214. See supra note 207.
215. See Parker & Colella, supra note 20, at 902-14 (arguing that two Supreme
Court decisions decided after Invin cast serious doubt on the proposition that the
FTCA's limitations periods may be equitably tolled).
216. See id.
217. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
218. Id. at 117-18.
219. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1990); see also United States

v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 534 n.7 (1995) (citing Dalm for the proposition that the

statute of limitations in a tax refund statute "narrow[s] the waiver of sovereign immunity ... by barring the tardy").

220. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-25.
221. See, eg., idL at 117 (stating that the purpose of the statute of limitations provision is "to encourage the prompt presentation of claims"); Gould v. United States

Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738,741-42 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (not-
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A plaintiff will fail to overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption if
the face of her complaint reveals that she knew or should have known
of her injury and the cause of that injury more than two years before
an administrative claim was filed with the appropriate agency. To satisfy Prong 1, a plaintiff need not allege specifically that she did not
know or should not have known of her injury and the cause more than
two years before filing a claim. Most plaintiffs, however, provide both
the date on which they were injured and the date on which a claim
was fied with the federal agency, so that the face of the complaint will
often give the government a fairly good indication of when plaintiffs
believe their claims accrued. The simplest example is if a plaintiff alleges that on a certain date she suffered personal injuries as a result of
the negligent conduct of a federal employee. Comparing the date of
injury and cause with the date on which the claim was filed will be
dispositive of the two-year limitations question.
To meet its burden of production, the United States must make a
prima facie case that the plaintiff was armed with enough facts about
injury and cause more than two years before an administrative claim
was fied with the relevant federal agency. Because the FTCA's accrual standard poses the question of whether the plaintiff was on sufficient notice of injury and cause, the government can produce
documentary or testimonial evidence regarding the facts in the plaintiff's possession more than two years before she fied her claim with
the government. The government need not produce evidence that the
plaintiff knew the full extent of her injuries for the two-year clock to
begin running.2 2 The government may also present evidence that the
plaintiff "should have known" of injury and cause more than two
years before filing a claim with the agency. This evidence may consist
of facts well known throughout the community in which the plaintiff
resides. Additionally, expert testimony may be offered on the question of whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in light of
the facts known to her more than two years before a claim was fied
with the federal agency.
If the government meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must
then persuade the district court that her claim was timely fied with
the appropriate federal agency. 2 3 The argument can be made, howing that statutes of limitations protect defendants from having to confront controversies after the loss of evidence).
222. See, e.g., Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The
statute of limitations begins to run upon the discovery of the injury, even if the full

extent of the injury is not discovered until much later."); Robbins v. United States,
624 F.2d 971, 972-73 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that an injury begins the running of the
statutory period even if the "ultimate damage is unknown or unpredictable").
223. See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to the FTCA's statute of
limitations); Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 60 (7th Cir. 1985) (same); Thompson v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 762, 766 & n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (same).
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ever, that because the "should have known" standard is very much
like a defense of contributory negligence-each aimed at showing that
the plaintiff did not act reasonably-the government should bear the
burden of persuasion on the issue." 4 The argument is unpersuasive.
Comparing the "should have known" inquiry to the defense of contributory negligence overlooks the point that, historically, allocating
the burden of proof has proceeded along different lines when subject
matter jurisdiction is at issue than when an affirmative defense is at
issue. Jurisdiction-seeking parties have always carried the burden of
persuasion on the jurisdictional issue, whereas defendants have always
shouldered the burden of proving affirmative defenses. More importantly, though, imposing a burden of persuasion on the government
with respect to the "should have known" standard but imposing a burden of persuasion on the plaintiff with respect to the actual notice
standard fosters non-uniformity in the allocation of the burden of
proof. Because the Act's statute of limitations is a jurisdictional condition, the plaintiff must carry the burden of persuasion on the jurisdiction question, regardless of the particulars of the jurisdictional
condition itself.
3. Allocation for the Six-Month Limitations Provision: The Curse
of Schmidt v. United States
The six-month limitations period in the FTCA applies to the period
during which a plaintiff must file suit in federal district court after her
The FTCA provides that the six-month
claim is finally denied.'
clock begins to run "after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which
[the claim] was presented. ' ' 226 There are two issues here. The first is
whether suit was filed more than six months after the date of the denial letter, and the second is whether the plaintiff received a proper
"final denial." This section does not address the latter issue because it
is precisely the same question posed in the administrative-exhaustion
context. 227 Accordingly, we only discuss burden allocation with respect to whether the plaintiff fied a complaint within six months from
the date of the denial letter. This determination, in turn, may depend
upon the date on which a final denial was mailed to the claimant.
To meet its burden of production, the United States must present
evidence suggesting that the plaintiff's claim was denied in writing and
mailed to the plaintiff by certified or registered mail more than six
months before the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court. A copy
of the denial letter and evidence of the method of delivery is plainly
sufficient to meet this burden. The plaintiff then bears the burden of
224.
225.
226.
227.

See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 8, § 65, at 451.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
Mtt
See supra Part IV.A.3.
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persuading the district court that her suit was timely, something the
plaintiff will have a difficult time doing short of arguing for equitable
tolling of the statute.228
The question of how to best allocate the burden of proof with respect to the FTCA's six-month limitations period was squarely addressed in Schmidt v. United States (Schmidt 1).29 There, the plaintiff
was injured on a plane and filed a claim with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), alleging that her injuries were caused by negligent air traffic controllers.1 0 The FAA denied the claim in writing on
November 19, 1986; the plaintiff's attorney received the letter on November 24, 1986; and the plaintiff ified suit on May 21, 1987.231 The
government moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the suit was timebarred because it was filed more than six months after the date of the
denial letter. 32 The plaintiff asserted that the claim was not mailed
until November 21, 1986, thereby making her suit timely. 33 Neither
the plaintiff nor the government could establish the date on which the
denial letter was mailed because the FAA gave its outgoing mail to a
private carrier.2 4 Plainly, if the denial letter was mailed on the date it
was drafted (November 19, 1986), the plaintiff's suit would be untimely by two days. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff failed to
meet her burden of complying with the FTCA's six-month limitations
period. z 5
In Schmidt I, the Eight Circuit affirmed. The Schmidt I court stated
that "[t]he district court correctly noted that the [plaintiff] bore the
burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction once the Government challenged it." 6 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district
court's conclusion that the suit should have been dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction." 7 "[T]he evidence," reasoned the court,
"fails to establish the [plaintiff's] contention that the denial letter was
not mailed until November 21, [1986]. Consequently, the [plaintiff
has] failed to carry [her] burden of establishing the facts to support
subject matter jurisdiction."" 8 The Supreme Court, however, granted
certiorari, vacated Schmidt I, and remanded the case to the Eighth
228. But see Parker & Colella, supra note 20, at 911-14 (arguing that the FTCA's

six-month limitations period cannot be equitably tolled as a matter of law).
229. 901 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 498 U.S. 1077
(1991), on remand, 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991).
230. See 901 F.2d at 681-82.
231. See id. at 682.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 683.
237. See id.
238. Id.

1999]

JURISDICTIONAND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

2921

Circuit for consideration in light of Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs. 39
On remand, the Eight Circuit in Schmidt v. United States (Schmidt
I/) reversed the district court. 4 Stating that the "implicit holding" in
Irwin was that the FTCA's limitations period is not jurisdictional and
may be equitably tolled, the Schmidt H court concluded the effect of
this "implicit holding is to remove the burden of proving the date of
mailing from the [plaintiff]. Because the FTCA's statute of limitations
is not jurisdictional, failure to comply with it is merely an affirmative
defense which the defendant has the burden of establishing."' 4 Because the government had not established the date on which the plaintiff's denial letter was mailed, "[t]he government ... would not have

met its burden [of proof] had the burden been placed on it in the
district court."'- 2

Schmidt 11s conclusion that the FTCA's six-month limitations period is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional condition
simply reads too much into Irwin. As has been argued in more detail
elsewhere,' 43 Irwin does not stand for the proposition that the
FTCA's limitations periods are not jurisdictional; they are, as long as
they condition the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, which
they unquestionably do.'" Once Irwin is properly understood,
Schmidt I's holding-the Act's six-month limitations period is an affirmative defense that must be ultimately proved by the government-falls of its own weight. Schmidt II, therefore, is a thin reed
upon which to argue that the government bears the ultimate burden of
proof when the six-month limitations period is raised as a jurisdictional bar to suit.
It is a close question, however, whether the allocation rule we propose would produce a result similar to that reached by the Schmidt II
court. On one hand, a court could have reasonably inferred that the
date of the denial letter, coupled with the evidence showing that the
letter was given to a private mail service, is sufficient to make a prima
facie case that the six-month clock began running on November 19,
239. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
240. 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991).

241. Id. at 640.
242. ld.

243. See Parker & Colella, supra note 20, at 902-04.
244. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608-10 (1990); United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983); United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979). Just because the Supreme Court vacated Schmidt I and remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit for consideration in light

of Irwin surely does not mean that Schmidt I was wrongly decided on the burden-ofproof issue. Because Invin dealt exclusively with the question of equitable tolling, the

Schmidt II court should have determined in the first instance whether the FTCA's sixmonth limitations period may be equitably tolled, rather than announce a new rule
for allocating the burden of proving compliance (or non-compliance) with the
FrCA's statute of limitations.
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1986. On the other hand, an argument can be made that the government should have provided the court with some evidence linking the
date of the letter with the mailing by registered or certified mail,
something the government did not do. Resolving this problem turns
on whether the six-month limitations provision is triggered only when
a denial letter is mailed by certified or registered mail. The question,
whose resolution is beyond the scope of this Article, is an open one
under the cases.24 5
C.

The DiscretionaryFunction Exception

Congress included a discretionary function exception in the FTCA,
the text of which states that the Act shall not apply to "[a]ny claim...
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused. 2' 4 6 The discretionary function exception is
grounded in the separation of powers doctrine 47 and is intended "to
prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic,
and political policy through the
12 48
medium of an action in tort.
Through four Supreme Court decisions handed down over the past
fifty years,2 49 a two-part test has evolved for applying the discretionary function exception. First, the exception covers conduct that is
"discretionary" in nature. Therefore, the challenged conduct must involve "an element of judgment or choice," rather than mandatory
compliance with a specific "federal statute, regulation or policy. 2 5 0
Second, assuming that the challenged act or omission involves discretion, the exception applies only when the government conduct is
"based on considerations of public policy" 21' 1 or is "susceptible to pol245. Compare Raddatz v. United States, 750 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that there was no valid final denial where the denial letter not sent by certified or
registered mail), with Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272,274 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that the six-month clock began running even though the denial letter
was not sent by certified or registered mail because the plaintiff suffered no
prejudice).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
247. See, e.g., Tew v. United States, 86 F.3d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The discretionary function exception is grounded in the doctrine of the separation of powers."); Wright v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 930, 932 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (noting that
separation of powers principles support the discretionary function exception).
248. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
249. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991); Berkovitz v. United States,
486 U.S. 531 (1988); Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 797; Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953). For a discussion of the evolution of the discretionary function exception prior to Gaubert,see Fishback & Killefer, supra note 21.
250. Gaubert,499 U.S. at 322 (citations omitted).
251. Id. at 323 (citation omitted).
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icy analysis. ''11 2 When faced with a challenge to federal subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to the discretionary function exception, courts
must decide whether the act or omission that is the basis of the cause

of action is discretionary and, if so, whether it has public policy
implications.
1.

Courts Grapple with Allocating the Burden of Proof: The
Curse of Prescott v. United States

In contrast to the relatively well-defined parameters of the exception itself, courts have reached inconsistent results with respect to

which party bears the burden of proving the applicability or non-applicability of the discretionary function exception. Some courts have
held that the United States bears the ultimate burden of proving the
applicability of the exception.s 3 Other courts have found that the
FTCA plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the discretionary
function exception does not apply2 54 Still other courts have left the
252. Id. at 325.
253. See, eg., Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that the government has the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to the
FTCA); Carlyle v. United States, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); Stewart v.
United States, 199 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1952) (same); Cazales v. Lecon, Inc., 994 F.
Supp. 765, 771 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (same); Alef v. United States Dep't of Interior, 990 F.
Supp. 932, 934 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (same); Davis v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 368,
370 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (same); Angle v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 1386, 1390 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (same), affd, 89 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1996); Brown v.United States, No. 92CV-82S, 1994 WL 319015, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 8, 1994) (same); Doolin v. United
States, No. 93 C 2377, 1994 WL 233829, at *2 (N.D.Ill. May 23, 1994) (same); cf.
Smith v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 159, 168 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding that the discretionary function exception applied in Suits in Admiralty Act and the burden of proof
was on the government).
254. Courts that have placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff have not provided
a detailed analysis of the issue. The strongest circuit court statement is in Aragon v.
United States, 146 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 1998). In that case, the Tenth Circuit held that
plaintiff must show-as part of his overall burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction-that the discretionary function exception does not apply because it "poses a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit." Id. at 823 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (ruling on a
motion involving the discretionary function exception and the independent contractor
exception, and stating, "plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion if subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1)"); Miller v. United States Dep't of Transp.,
710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Among the district courts, two
have concluded, with minimal analysis, that after the United States raises the burden
of proof issue through a dispositive motion, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
proving that the exception does not apply. See Pifer v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 971,
972 (N.D. W.Va. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff "bears the burden of persuasion
because a party who sues the United States bears the burden of identifying an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity"); Hall v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin.,
825 F. Supp. 427, 433 (D.N.H. 1993) (holding that "it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs
to show that their case falls outside of the protective bounds of the 'discretionary
function' exception"). In addition, without any analysis of the burden-of-proof issue
with respect to the discretionary function exception, some courts have stated generally that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction under the
FTCA and then ruled on the applicability of the discretionary function exception. See,
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issue open. 255

Just as Irwin and Schmidt II are curses on the house of the statute of6
limitations, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Prescott v. United States25
has played the same role in the discretionary function context. Prescott, unfortunately, contains the most detailed (and ultimately erroneous) analysis of burden allocation regarding the FTCA's discretionary
function exception. In Prescott,workers at a nuclear test site brought
an action against the United States to recover damages for injuries
allegedly sustained during the government's nuclear testing program. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the United States committed eight
separate tortious acts leading to their injuries, including failure to advise workers of the dangers of radiation exposure and failure to take
precautions to prevent unnecessary exposures. 258 The United States
did not offer any evidence "that the alleged acts of negligence flowed
from choices grounded in political, social or economic policy. '2 59 Instead, the government argued that everything it did in carrying out the
nuclear testing program fell within the discretionary function exception. The Ninth Circuit rejected such a blanket coverage of immunity.
Because the United States failed to offer any evidence of policy judgments, the court stated that the jurisdictional issue turned on the "allocation of the burden of proving (or 26disproving)
the applicability of
0
the discretionary function exception.
The Prescott court initially noted that the plaintiff has "the burden
of persuading the court that it has subject matter jurisdiction" under
the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.261 The court reasoned,
however, that the plaintiff did not need to disprove each of the
e.g., Val-U Constr. Co. v. United States, 905 F. Supp. 728, 736 (D.S.D. 1995) (finding
that the plaintiff did not meet its burden in showing that the defendant acted outside
the discretionary function exception); Higgins v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 232, 235
(M.D.N.C. 1995) (refusing jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to plead facts which
would take the action outside of the discretionary function exception), affid, 81 F.3d
149 (4th Cir. 1996); Goewey v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 1268, 1274-78 (D.S.C.
1995) (barring a plaintiffs claims for failure to meet the burden under the discretionary function exception), affjd, 106 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 685
(1998).
255. See Mesa v. United States, 123 F.3d 1435, 1439 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); Ochran v.
United States, 117 F.3d 495, 504 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d
1523, 1526 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993); Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1105 n.7 (10th
Cir. 1993); Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1542 (10th Cir. 1992); Nyazie v.
Kennedy, No. 97-0120, 1998 WL 32601, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Wright v.
United States, 868 F. Supp. 930, 933 n.6 (E.D. Tenn. 1994); Barrett v. United States,
845 F. Supp. 774, 780 n.7 (D. Kan. 1994).
256. 973 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1992).
257. See id. at 698.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 701.
261. Id.
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FTCA's thirteen jurisdictional exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2680.262
The court explained that the plaintiff only needed to invoke jurisdiction through a complaint that facially alleges matters not excepted by
§ 2680. Then, the burden falls on the government "to prove the applicability of a specific provision of [the section]."2 63 The Ninth Circuit
determined that this was the appropriate approach because "an exception to the FTCA's general waiver of immunity, although jurisdictional on its face, is analogous to an affirmative defense." 26 Having
placed the burden of persuasion on the United States, the Ninth Circuit could not help but find that the United States' motion should
have been denied because the government did not offer any evidence
that the alleged acts involved an element of judgment or "that the
judgment (if any) was grounded in social, economic, or political policy. '" 265 Courts have followed Prescott's lead in placing the ultimate
burden of proof on the United States. 2 1
Prescottwrongly held that the government bears the ultimate burden of proving that the discretionary function exception applies. The
principle defect in Prescott is that the court failed to distinguish between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion and
thereby preserve the fundamental principle that the plaintiff must
prove subject matter jurisdiction. Without making the distinction, the
Ninth Circuit placed the entire burden of proof-including both the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion-on the government and imposed on the plaintiff only a wafer-thin burden of filing a
complaint that is not jurisdictionally defective on its face. Prescott
placed the burden of proof on the government because, in the court's
eyes, the plaintiff would carry an otherwise unreasonable burden of
having to disprove each of the FTCA's exceptions to federal jurisdic262. See id (citing Carlyle v. United States, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982) and
Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1952)).

263. Id. (quoting Carlyle, 674 F.2d at 556).
264. Id. at 702.

265. Id. at 703.
266. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 163 F3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the government bears the burden of establishing that discretionary immunity applies

and that the test for establishing the discretionary function excpetion is met); National
Union Fire Ins. v. United States, 115 F.3d 1415, 1417 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1053 (1998); Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1451 (9th Cir.
1996) (same); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1995) (same). But

see Laurence v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1445, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that
"[i]n this Circuit at this time," the government bears the burden of proving the applicability of the discretionary function exception, but citing the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Kiehn as questioning whether the minority rule of Prescott is harmonious with
United States v. Gaubert), aff'd sub nOraL Laurence v. Department of the Navy, 59

F.3d 112 (9th Cir. 1995). Some district courts, outside of the Ninth Circuit, have also
followed Prescott. See, eg., Angle v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 1386, 1390 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (placing the burden of proving the applicability of the discretionary func-

tion exception on the United States); Brown v. United States, No. 92-CV-82S, 1994
WL 319015, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 8, 1994) (same); Doolin v. United States, No. 93-C-

2377, 1994 WL 233829, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1994) (same).
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tion.267 Under the burden-shifting scheme proposed here, however,
the plaintiff has no such obligation. Only after the government produces enough evidence to make a prima facie case that the discretionary function exception applies must the plaintiff establish her right to
sue the United States in federal court by proving that the exception
does not apply.
Prescott is deficient for yet another reason. The Ninth Circuit, in
essence, emasculated the jurisdictional nature of the discretionary
function exception and proceeded to adopt a Summers-type shift of
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. 68 In so doing, the Prescott court ignored the considerations that explain a burden shift for non-jurisdictional substantive issues versus those
implicated when allocating the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. It may very well be, for example, that shifting the burden of
persuasion is generally permissible where one party controls information relevant to a merit based issue. But this access-to-information
rationale simply is not a viable basis for shifting the burden of persuasion when subject matter jurisdiction is at issue. Because federal
courts are of limited jurisdiction and because jurisdictional determinations should be made early in a case, the party moving for dismissal is
best able to focus the jurisdictional factual and legal issues, regardless
of whether that party controls information relevant to the issues. The
enhanced ability to narrow issues is reason only to impose a burden of
production on the government, for once the government raises the
discretionary function exception and produces prima facie evidence
that it applies, there is no reason to excuse the plaintiff from convincing the court that subject matter jurisdiction exists.
69
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gaubert
undermines the Prescottcourt's rationale and supports burden-shifting
of the kind proposed here. In addition to its rationale that the plaintiff should not have to disprove multiple exceptions, the Prescottcourt
reasoned that the United States was the most appropriate party to
show that its conduct was the result of "choices grounded in social,
economic or political policy."270 In Gaubert, however, the Supreme
Court stated that proof of actual policy considerations was not necessary as long as the challenged action or omission was susceptible to
policy analysis.27 ' Moreover, stating that governmental action taken
pursuant to a policy-based regulation is presumed to be grounded in
policy considerations, the Supreme Court endorsed a burden-shifting
scheme in keeping with that proposed here. Once the government
makes a prima facie showing that the actor's conduct was pursuant to
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See Prescott,973 F.2d at 701.
See supra Part II.B.1.
499 U.S. 315 (1991).
Prescott,973 F.2d at 702.
See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324-25.
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a policy-based provision, the government enjoys a (rebuttable) presumption that the governmental conduct is policy based. Simply put,
our prima facie case operates just like the Gaubert presumption.
Once the government earns this presumption, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct was not discretionary or was not grounded in the policy considerations underlying the provision.2 72 Therefore, like Schmidt 1I and the
statute of limitations, Prescottfails to provide a sound basis for concluding that the government must bear the ultimate burden of proving
the discretionary function exception.
2. The Appropriate Allocation of the Burden of Proving the
Discretionary Function Exception
Folowing the rule proposed here, imposing the burden of production on the government and the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff
is appropriate in cases in which the government asserts the discretionary function exception. As with other jurisdictional conditions, the
government should bear the initial burden of production on the discretionary function exception. This is because the government is in
the best position to narrow the jurisdictional factual and legal issues
sufficiently for the plaintiff and the court.,
Because the plaintiff
must always establish federal jurisdiction, however, the plaintiff must
bear the burden of persuading the court that it has jurisdiction after
the government has challenged that jurisdiction by raising the
exception.
To overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption, the plaintiff must allege in her complaint a cause of action that, on its face, does not come
within the parameters of the discretionary function exception.2 74 For
example, a plaintiff cannot allege a cause of action based upon exactly
the same type of activity or omission that a court has found to be
272. See id. The Prescott court stated, on a petition for rehearing, that its decision
was consistent with Gaubert. See Prescott, 973 F.2d at 702 n.4. The Ninth Circuit,

however, referred only to the Supreme Court's holding that "a plaintiff must advance
a claim that is facially outside the discretionary function exception." Id. The Ninth
Circuit did not address the Supreme Court's language regarding the rebuttable presumption. Id. Other courts have questioned the continuing vitality of Prescott in light
of Gaubert.See Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1105 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993); Nyazie v. Kennedy, No. 97-0120, 1998 WL 32601, at *4-*5 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998);

Laurence v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1445, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd sub nona.
Laurence v. Department of the Navy, 59 F.3d 112 (9th Cir. 1995).
273. See Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 504 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) (failing to

address whether the plaintiff or the government bears the burden of proving the applicability of the discretionary function exception, but stating that "[rjegardless where
the burden of persuasion ultimately rests, the burden of production of the policy considerations that might influence the challenged conduct must be on the
Government").
274. See Kiehn, 984 F.2d at 1105 n.7.
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In Prescott, the

government ostensibly argued that the face of the plaintiffs' complaint
did not overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption. The government
argued, based upon the Ninth Circuit's prior opinion in In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation ("Atmospheric
Testing"),27 6 that everything the government did in carrying out its nu-

clear testing program was covered by the discretionary function exception.277 Thus, according to the government, the plaintiffs'
complaint, which challenged certain aspects of that program, should
have been dismissed on its face because there was no set of facts that
the plaintiffs could establish in the allegations that would fall outside
the exception. The Ninth Circuit, however, found that Atmospheric
Testing could not be read so broadly.278 Having found that the plaintiffs' complaint was facially valid, the government was destined to
lose. The government had filed its motion as a motion for summary

judgment and had produced no evidence. 7 9 Thus, the government

had a rather poor record (no evidence on the applicability of the discretionary function exception) and, given that record, faced an insurmountable legal standard (bearing the ultimate burden of proving the
exception applied). The Prescott court had no trouble finding that the
district court had properly denied the government's summary judgment motion. 280
275. In Mesa v. United States, 123 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1997), a facial attack was
successful. The plaintiffs alleged that government DEA agents failed to ascertain the
identity of the inhabitants of the plaintiffs' house and that the agents failed to cease
questioning and detaining the plaintiffs once the agents allegedly should have known
that the subject of the arrest warrant was not present. See id. at 1438. The government apparently offered no evidence regarding the application of the discretionary
function exception. The plaintiffs, however, claimed that they were entitled to discovery before the court ruled on the government's motion to dismiss. See id. at 1439. The
court stated that it is clear from the face of the complaint that the allegation of negligence involved the process of identifying the subject of an arrest warrant, which fundamentally implicated "an exercise of discretion and considerations of public policy."
Id.; see also Kiehn, 984 F.2d at 1105 n.6 (finding that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn
claim was not facially outside the discretionary function exception and therefore
could not survive a motion to dismiss).
276. 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987).
277. See Prescott, 973 F.2d at 698.
278. See id. at 699-700.
279. See id. at 700-02. Filing the dispositive motion as a motion for summary judgment, though unavoidable in some circuits, see supra Part I, raises a problem of establishing the quantum of proof necessary to have a court reach the merits of a plaintiff's
FFCA claim. We argue that the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the discretionary function exception does not apply.
Under a summary judgment standard, however, the plaintiff can proceed to a determination of the merits of her claim by merely establishing a genuine issue of fact
regarding the application of the exception, with all ambiguities resolved in the plaintiffs favor. Unless the court has a preliminary hearing on the exception's application,
the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is, in effect, circumvented by the
procedural posture of the dispositive motion. See supra Part II.
280. See Prescott, 973 F.2d at 702-03.
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Moreover, overcoming the no-jurisdiction presumption may be
somewhat more complicated in the discretionary function context
given the confusing, and sometimes conflicting, language in federal
court opinions stemming from a single sentence in the Supreme
8 There, the Court made
Court's decision in United States v. Gaubert."
the following, rather straightforvard, statement: "For a complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss [based on the discretionary function exception], it must allege facts which would support a finding that the
challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be
s
grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime."21
Some lower
courts have interpreted this language to mean that FTCA plaintiffs
bear the ultimate burden of pleading and proving that the discretionary function exception does not apply.213 This reading of Gaubert,
however, is overbroad. The Court made the statement in the context
of its holding that there is a presumption that actions taken pursuant
to a discretionary regulation are based upon the policy underpinning
of the regulation.'
The Court's language surely does not imply that
every FTCA complaint must include an allegation regarding the nonapplicability of the discretionary function exception. Properly understood, then, Gaubert stands for the proposition that, where an FTCA
plaintiff has alleged negligent conduct involving a regulation, the
plaintiff must also allege facts showing that the challenged act or omission violated a non-discretionary regulatory requirement or was not
grounded in the policy of the regulation. '
Once a plaintiff overcomes the no-jurisdiction presumption, most
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the discretionary
function exception will require a "particularized and fact-specific inquiry" into the two-part discretionary function test.286 To meet its
burden of production on the first part, the United States may present
relevant policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or statutes that bear
281. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
282. Id. at 324-25.
283. See, e.g., Val-U Constr. Co. v. United States, 905 F. Supp. 728, 736 (D.S.D.
1995) (stating that the burden of proving that the discretionary function exception
does not apply is appropriately placed on the plaintiff); Wright v. United States, 868
F. Supp. 930, 932 n.5 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (noting that Gaubert implies that the burden
lies with the plaintiff to establish that the conduct of the government agency or the
employee is not protected under the exception); McElroy v. United States, 861 F.
Supp. 585, 592 n.12 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
284. See Gaubert,499 U.S. at 324-25.
285. See, e.g., Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park v. Phillips & Jordan, Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 283, 286 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (stating that "where the regulatory scheme expressly
or impliedly confers policy-imbued decisions to the discretion of a federal agency, the
burden is on the plaintiff to allege non-discretionary acts that give rise to liability");
AIG Aviation Ins. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 1496, 1501 (D. Utah
1995) (stating that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to meet the Gauberttest because the
plaintiffs failed to allege that inspectors' discretionary acts were not part of relevant
regulatory policy schemes).
286. Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1992).
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on the alleged tortious act or omission.2 8 7 The government may pres-

ent these provisions to demonstrate that the challenged governmental
act or omission is not specifically circumscribed by any governmental
directive. Under the second part of the discretionary function test, the
United States may present a basis for the court to conclude that the
challenged act or omission has policy implications. The United States
may submit affidavits or deposition testimony from government employees and documentary evidence showing that the alleged acts or

omissions have actual social, economic, or political policy implications.288 The government can also show that its employee was acting
pursuant to a discretionary statute, regulation, or guideline; in that
case, there is a "strong presumption" that the employee's conduct is
grounded in the policies of that provision. 289 In addition, the Supreme
Court has stated, the act or omission need only be susceptible to pol-

icy analysis. 29° Accordingly, the government can present a hypothetical policy analysis, showing that policies could be implicated by the
discretionary act or omission. Thus, in cases in which there is no evidence that policy considerations played a role in the discretionary act
287. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 368, 371 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (noting
that the plaintiff failed to point out any statute or regulation that dictated the appropriate manner to maintain National Park Service ("NPS") roadways, and citing statutes and regulations that were relevant to NPS decision-making and gave the NPS
discretion in roadway maintenance).
288. See, e.g., Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273, 1277 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting
that the government submitted affidavits demonstrating that decisions in allocating
personnel and funding for the construction of a missile site were grounded in national
defense and economic policy considerations); Nyazie v. Kennedy, No. 97-0120, 1998
WL 32601, at *8 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998) (acknowledging that the government
offered the affidavit of a parkway superintendent regarding policy concerns that impacted maintenance and warning decisions); Davis, 918 F. Supp. at 371-72 (noting that
the government offered the testimony of a National Park Service superintendent regarding economic policy, namely the impact of budgetary constraints).
289. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991). This is related to, but
distinguishable from, Gaubert's statement that the plaintiff must allege facts in her
complaint that would support a finding that challenged actions are not the type of
conduct that would be grounded in the policy of a regulatory regime. See id. at 324-25.
The presumption that action taken pursuant to a policy-based regulation is grounded
in the policies of that regulation is a matter of proof and is an appropriate proffer on
the second part of the discretionary function test. That a plaintiff must allege facts
that would support a finding that the actions are not grounded in the policy of a
regulatory regime is a matter of pleading that may be part of the analysis on a facial
attack to the plaintiffs complaint. Courts have found that there is no jurisdiction
where the plaintiff fails to rebut this presumption. See, e.g., Irving v. United States,
162 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 1998) (en banc) (identifying policies underlying OSHA
inspection regulations and stating that the government had no burden of producing
evidence of policy because it could rest on the presumption that discretionary acts are
grounded in policy which the plaintiff failed to rebut); Garcia v. United States, 896 F.
Supp. 467, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that statutes and regulations regarding customs inspections are based on the policy of protecting the integrity of the nation's
borders and that the plaintiffs "failed to present any evidence which could overcome
the presumption that the challenged conduct was grounded in [that] policy").
290. See Gaubert,499 U.S. at 325.
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or omission and even in cases in which there is no evidence of a conscious decision to act or not to act, the exception would still apply if
there are potential policy implications. 291
Once the government has met its burden of production-giving the
court sufficient competent evidence to rule in its favor if no other evidence is presented-the burden must shift to the plaintiff to persuade
the court that subject matter jurisdiction exists. The plaintiff may attempt to defeat the government's prima facie case in one of two ways.
First, the plaintiff can show that a specific and mandatory statute, regulation, or similar provision does not give the government employee
any discretion to exercise judgment with respect to the challenged act
or omission. 2" Second, the plaintiff can show that the challenged act
or omission was not based on policy considerations and is not susceptible to policy analysis.29 3 Under either approach, the plaintiff must
291. See, e.g., Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 720-21 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the court is to look at "the nature of the challenged decision in an objective, or
general sense, and ask whether that decision is one which we would expect inherently
to be grounded in considerations of policy" and thus it is largely irrelevant whether
government agents actually engaged in a deliberative process); Kiehn v. United
States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1108 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was not necessary that
park rangers actually based their decisions upon any policy considerations because
such decisions were susceptible to policy analysis and therefore inherently involved
policy implications); Hagy v. United States, 976 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (W.D. Wash.
1997) (stating that "any decision not to warn the public of a danger posed by [human
growth hormone] is by nature policy-laden"); Davis, 918 F. Supp. at 372 (holding that
it is irrelevant whether any actual policy analysis took place because "the relevant
inquiry is whether, objectively, the decision was 'susceptible' to political, economic
and social policy analysis"); Bowman v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 979, 985 (M.D.
Fla. 1994) (holding that it is not necessary that there be any conscious decision for the
discretionary function exception to apply). But see Brown v. United States, No. 92CV-82S, 1994 WL 319015, at *17 (W.D.N.Y. June 8, 1994) (holding that the government failed to establish the second part of the discretionary function test because it
only suggested, without offering sufficient evidence, that policy factors influenced the
thoroughness of a government inspection).
292. See, e.g., Aragon v. United States, 146 F.3d 819, 823-24 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff unsuccessfully contended that the government failed to comply with a specific and mandatory provision requiring it to cooperate with local water
pollution authorities and to avoid polluting the groundwater through its disposal activities); Kirchmann, 8 F.3d at 1276 (holding that although plaintiff cited six sections
of various federal regulations, no specific statute or regulation was implicated);
Shrieve v. United States, 16 F. Supp.2d 853, 858 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (maintaining that
the plaintiff did not establish that postal service regulations mandated mail delivery to
both sides of a state road).
293. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890,896-97 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding
the plaintiffs' contention that the discretionary function exception did not apply because inspectors "should be guided by objective principles of safety, not concerns of
public policy"); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the inspector's
decision regarding where to connect lights involved technical judgments rather than
policy considerations). In Kirchumann, the Eighth Circuit used burden-shifting language to describe the second part of the discretionary function test. See 8 F.3d at 1277.
After discussing the evidence that the United States had submitted to show that missile construction decisions implicated national defense and economic policies, the
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persuade the court that the discretionary function exception does not
apply.
Both the government and the plaintiff will have a strong incentive
to present the best evidence available to persuade the court of their
respective positions. In theory, it should not matter where the burden
of persuasion lies because the party that submits the weightier evidence should prevail under a preponderance of the evidence standard.2 94 In practice, however, the burden of proof in the discretionary
function context is vitally important, because, as Prescott illustrates,
courts can use the burden of proof as a procedural tool for granting or
denying dispositive motions challenging subject matter jurisdiction.
D. The Independent ContractorException
The FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is also limited to the acts
and omissions of agents or employees of the United States.295 Under
the FTCA, the United States is not liable for the negligent acts or
omissions of an independent contractor. In two decisions, the
Supreme Court has given lower courts guidance in determining
whether parties are independent contractors or agents of the United
States.2 96 The Court has held that the distinction between an independent contractor and an agent turns on the absence of authority
of the government to control the "detailed physical performance" of
the contractor.2 9 1 Thus, the United States is not liable for the contractor's acts or omissions unless it supervises the "day-to-day operations"
of the contractor.298 In addition to this "strict control test," some circuits have used factors listed in section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine whether an individual is an employee or
court, citing both Gaubertand Prescott,stated that the plaintiffs "have offered nothing
that would have allowed the trial court to conclude that the government's stated reasons for not supervising the day-to-day operations of the contractors are pretextual
... or would be objectively illegitimate even if pretextual." Id. (citations omitted).
294. Indeed, courts have avoided deciding the burden-of-proof issue by stating that
their holding would be the same regardless of which party bore the burden. See Mesa
v. United States, 123 F.3d 1435, 1439 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the discretionary function exception applies "regardless of who bears the burden"); Kiehn, 984 F.2d

at 1105 n.7 (stating that the rule of burden allocation of Prescott may be suspect in
light of Gaubert, but that this did not alter the discretionary function analysis in the
case).
295. Under the FTCA, the plaintiff can only recover those damages "caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1) (Supp. 111996) (emphasis added). The Act's definition of an "employee
of the government" includes officers and employees of federal agencies and the mili-

tary, but the definition of "Federal agency" expressly excludes "any contractor with
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994).
296. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815-18 (1976); Logue v, United
States, 412 U.S. 521, 531-32 (1973).
297. Logue, 412 U.S. at 527-28.

298. Id. at 529.
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an independent contractor.2 99 The Restatement lists the following
factors:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;,
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
299. See Linkous v. United States, 142 F.3d 271, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1998); Robb v.
United States, 80 F.3d 884, 889 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996); Will v. United States, 60 F3d 656,
659 (9th Cir. 1995); Leone v. United States, 910 F.2d 46,50 (2d Cir. 1990); cf.Curry v.
United States, 97 F.3d 412, 414 (10th Cir. 1996) (using a modification of the Restatement factors for a government contractor case).
Courts typically resort to the Restatement factors when examining the contractual
relationships of private physicians who work at medical facilities operated by the
United States. In such a situation, the Fifth Circuit has reasoned that it was necessary
to consider the Restatement factors rather than rely only on a "strict control test"
because, otherwise, no professional who exercises "professional judgment could ever
be considered an employee of the United States for FTCA purposes." Broussard v.
United States, 989 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1993). But see Leone, 910 F.2d at 49 (finding
no support for making any distinction between professionals and other contractees,
but then stating "that the strict control test, as well as principles of agency, govern this
inquiry" (emphasis added)).
The lower courts' reference to § 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency had its
genesis in the Supreme Court's Logue decision. In support of the control test, Logue
noted that under modem common law, as reflected in the Restatement, the distinction between a contractor and an agent turns on the absence of authority of the principal to control the physical performance of the contractor. See Logue, 412 U.S. at
527. Actually, the "extent of control" is only the first of ten Restatement factors, and
the Logue Court's reference to the Restatement to support the control test would not
itself justify use of all of the Restatement factors. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's
two independent contractor cases under the FTCA, Logue and Orleans, both dealt
with organizations rather than individuals, situations where the control test by itself
was arguably dispositive. In situations involving individuals rather than organizations,
it would not be unreasonable to refer to the other Restatement factors.
In the final analysis, the relevant inquiry is what Congress intended when it used
the terms "employee" and "contractor" in the Act. A general principle of statutory
interpretation is that, absent a statutory definition, Congress intended to use the established common law meaning of terms. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301,
307-08 (1992). The Supreme Court has relied on this doctrine in interpreting the
terms "employee" and "contractor" under the federal copyright statute to justify incorporation of general common law of agency. See Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989).
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(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.3 °

As with the discretionary function exception, courts have reached
different results in determining who should bear the burden of proof
on the independent contractor issue. Most courts have held that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a party is an agent or employee of the government. 30 1 At least one court, however, has held

that the burden of proving that the independent contractor exception

applies lies with the United States? °0 That court, though, relied on

Prescott,a decision we have suggested incorrectly allocates the burden
of proof.
The proposed allocation rule is in keeping with the parameters of
the independent contractor exception. To overcome the no-jurisdiction presumption, the plaintiff must initially allege a claim that is not,
on its face, barred by the independent contractor exception. This does
not mean, however, that the plaintiff must specifically include any allegations regarding the independent contractor exception. If a plaintiff alleges, for example, that the "United States is liable for the
negligent acts of its independent contractor," call it Acme Widgets,
Inc., that claim would clearly be subject to dismissal pursuant to a
Rule 12(b)(1) facial challenge. A claim that "the United States is liable for the negligent actions of Acme Widgets, Inc." would not necessarily suffer the same fate.3 °3
If the plaintiff overcomes the no-jurisdiction presumption, the burden shifts to the United States to produce evidence on the applicability of the independent contractor exception. The determination of
whether an FTCA claim is jurisdictionally defective under the independent contractor exception is inherently fact specific. To establish its prima facie case, the government may focus on the intent of the
parties and produce contractual provisions that describe the relation-

300. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958).
301. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating
that under the independent contractor exception, the "plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion if subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1)"); Daniels
v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., No. 93-3316, 1994 WL 495862, at *2 (E.D. La.
Sept. 7, 1994) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to meet his "burden to produce
material facts indicating that [the defendant] actually did operate as an employee of
the United States"); Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 690 F. Supp. 527, 529 (E.D. La.
1988) (holding that the plaintiff bears "the burden of proving that the allegedly negligent contractor was an employee of the Government, not an independent contractor"), affd, 877 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1989); Walker v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 973,
978 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (finding that the plaintiff in a malpractice action had "failed to
sustain his burden to prove" that a doctor was an 'employee of the Government"'
under the FTCA (citation omitted)).
302. See Hagy v. United States, 976 F. Supp. 1373, 1376-77 (W.D. Wash. 1997)
(holding that the government bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff's claim
falls within the independent contractor exception to the FTCA.)
303. It would be vulnerable, however, to an attack. The statute states that the
United States is not liable for the actions of "any contractor with the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994). The statute does not use the term "independent contractor."
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ship between the government and the contractor. 30 4 Many government contracts contain explicit language stating that the contractor
acts "as an independent contractor and not as an agent of the government."3 °5 This, of course, is not determinative if the parties' course of
conduct shows that an agency relationship actually existed. 3 6 Thus,
the government will often produce other evidence indicating that the
contractor is independent and that the government should not be liable for the contractor's acts or omissions. The government may produce declarations or deposition testimony from government and
contractor employees stating how the relationship worked in practice; 30 7 historical documents that show who was responsible for performing certain functions; and, if the action involves a facility where
the employees worked, the government may produce statistics showing the number of government employees at the facility versus the
number of contractor employees there.
To meet its burden of persuasion, the plaintiff may present similar
evidence to show that the independent contractor exception does not
apply. 30 8 Courts, however, have held that the following factors, standing alone, are insufficient to defeat the independent contractor excep304. See, e.g., Wood v. Standard Prods. Co., 671 F.2d 825, 829 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that the terms of the contract are critical in determining the relationship between
the government and a contractor); Goewey v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 1268, 127475 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that the government met its burden by submitting contractual provisions showing that the contractor furnished the personnel, tools, and supplies and was responsible "for managing the total work product"), affd "tem., 1C6
F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998).
305. See Alexander v. United States, 605 F.2d 828, 832 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979);
Buchanan v. United States, 305 F.2d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 1962). But see B & A Marine
Co. v. American Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709, 711 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
the United States appointed a shipping company "'as its agent, and not as an independent contractor"' in its agreement (citation omitted)).
306. Whether the parties believed that they were creating an agency relationship is
only one of the factors for determining whether an agency relationship existed under
§ 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See Brown v. United States, No. 92-CV82S, 1994 WL 319015, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. June 8, 1994) (holding that even though a
contract provided that "'[p]erformance of work hereunder shall be subject to technical supervision of representatives of the Postal Service,"' the plaintiff failed to present
sufficient evidence to show that the government exercised authority to control the
contractor on a day-to-day basis (citation omitted)).
307. See, e.g., Hagy, 976 F. Supp. at 1377-78 (stating that the government established that it had no authority to exercise control over the employees of a National
Pituitary Agency by submitting declarations and deposition testimony); Connor v.
United States, 967 F. Supp. 894, 898 (M.D. La. 1997) (finding the government's submission of affidavit testimony to demonstrate the lack of an agency relationship
sufficient).
308. See, e.g., B & A Marine Co., 23 F.3d at 713-14 (finding that the plaintiff
presented contractual and affidavit evidence showing that a company was an agent of
the government); Kolovitz v. United States, No. 93 C 3395, 1995 WL 32612, at *4-*5
(N.D. M11.
Jan. 26, 1995) (holding that after the plaintiff presented contractual provisions and deposition testimony regarding the frequency of government inspections,
there was an issue of fact regarding whether the government supervised and controlled the contractor's work).
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tion: the government owned the property that is the subject of the
310
suit;30 9 the government funded the work that gave rise to the tort;
the government included contractual provisions that allow the government to monitor the contractor's performance; 311 or the government
could force compliance with federal regulations.
Yet, the plaintiff
may attack the persuasiveness of the government's prima facie case
and thereby cast doubt on the facts or precedents relied upon by the
government. Additionally, the plaintiff may wish to present her own
evidence that shows the independent contractor exception does not
apply. The plaintiff, for example, can depose the government's declar-

ants, seek production of government documents, and interview or subpoena contractor witnesses and documents. Regardless of which
tactic the plaintiff chooses, the plaintiff will have to offer a persuasive
rebuttal of the government's prima facie case, otherwise her case will

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to come to grips with the vexing question of
how the burden of proof should be allocated when a jurisdictional
condition of the FTCA is litigated. That journey has required us to
address a number of seemingly unrelated legal issues-Rule 12(b)(1)
conversion; burden-of-proof "theory"; federal-courts doctrine; and
waiver-of-sovereign-immunity principles. All of these issues, we have
309. See, e.g., Larsen v. Empresas El Yunque, Inc., 812 F.2d 14, 14-16 (1st Cir. 1986)
(finding the government not liable for a contractor's negligence though it "owned and
controlled" the premises where the accident occurred); Gowdy v. United States, 412
F.2d 525, 534-35 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding that the independent contractor exception
does not apply even though the government may have had "superior knowledge of
safety" of its property); Conner, 967 F. Supp. at 898 (holding that the plaintiffs' argument that the government was liable because it owned the premises was wholly inadequate to defeat the independent contractor motion).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 816 n.6 (1976) (noting that
"granting of funds can be conditional without changing the ... relationship" between
the contractor and the government); Hagy, 976 F. Supp. at 1377-78 (holding that the
power of the National Institute of Health to stop the funding of a human growth
hormone program did not demonstrate sufficient control to convert the program into
a federal agency for purposes of the FTCA).
311. See, e.g., Leone v. United States, 910 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
even though the government acted "generally as an overseer," the independent contractor exception applied); Brooks v. A. R. & S. Enters., Inc., 622 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir.
1980) (holding that the right to inspect did not nullify the independent contractor
exception).
312. See, e.g., Orleans, 425 U.S. at 815-16 (holding that the government, in fixing
conditions to implement federal objectives, "d[id] not convert the acts of entrepreneurs ... into federal governmental acts"); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 52930 (1973) (holding that the independent contractor exception applied even though the
government required a county prison contractor to comply with federal standards for
treatment of federal prisoners); Hines v. United States, 60 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that a requirement that a contractor comply with Postal Service regulations did not establish employee status).
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pointed out, converge at the doorstep of burden allocation. This Article suggests that distinguishing between the burden of persuasion and
the burden of production is a practical way to bring these principles
together into a uniform allocation rule that promotes the efficient resolution of jurisdictional determinations that is fair to both plaintiffs
and the United States.
The three-part rule proposed here recognizes the time-honored
principle that plaintiffs ultimately bear the burden of persuading an
Article III court that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a federal
statutory claim. At the same time, however, the rule also accounts for
the problems encountered by plaintiffs who may not know the jurisdictional defects in their FTCA suits and who may not possess information critical to a jurisdictional determination. The rule does so, not
by taking the draconian step of shifting the burden of persuasion onto
the United States, but by endorsing the more limited and principled
step of requiring the United States to raise the issue and produce sufficient competent evidence that an FTCA claim is jurisdictionally
barred. Once the government makes a prima facie case that a federal
district court lacks jurisdiction over an FICA claim, the plaintiff must
then satisfy her ultimate burden of persuading the court that she is
entitled to have her tort claim adjudicated in a federal forum.
When applied to the most frequently litigated jurisdictional conditions of the FTCA, the proposed rule imposes a uniform approach to
allocation. By advocating a uniform approach, we suggest that some
courts should take a second look at the allocation rule they have applied to the Act's statute of limitations and discretionary function exception. We have argued that, with respect to those two conditions,
courts, by shifting the burden of persuasion to the United States, have
unjustifiably strayed from the limited-jurisdiction principle and from
the Act's waiver-of-sovereign-immunity scheme.
In the end, rather than grapple with the theoretical nuances that
have burdened discussions of burden allocation, this Article attempts
to marry theory with practice, focusing on principles that courts and
commentators have agreed define the parameters of burden-of-proof
allocation. In doing so, we hope that the three-part rule proposed
here advances our collective understanding of burden allocation generally and burden allocation in FTCA litigation in particular, providing plaintiffs, the United States, and courts with a useful tool for
deciding when the federal courthouse doors should open and when
they should not.
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